ИСТИНА

Social media advertising has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. User participation in content creation and co-creation, as well as emergence and influence of opinion leaders allows this type of advertising to be unpaid for or paid indirectly. On the other hand, the study highlights that the majority of products and services advertised online are experience goods, which means their quality levels cannot be estimated before purchase and consumption. This creates incentives for businesses to use deceptive advertising – thus, understanding the conditions in which social media advertising is a credible signal of quality is crucial to protect consumers. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers - opinion leaders in a social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about placing an advertising message in their blog, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. This study investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.