ИСТИНА

One challenge to our theories of agency and moral responsibility from the cognitive science and psychology is the problem of implicit attitudes mainly discussed in the form of the problem of implicit bias Some experiments show that people who are not explicitly sexist or racist, in certain experimental conditions, are demonstrate discriminatory behavior. The features of such implicitly biased behavior are automatism, lack of consciousness and control over the course of action. Uhlmann and Cohen (2005) have shown that implicitly biased agents often are under the “illusion of objectivity”: they tailor the criteria of choice according to their preferences and cite them as an explanation of the action. The experiments of Norton, Vandello and Darley (2004) that implicit bias can result in the distortions in memory. Payne (2006) demonstrates that "bias can coexist with a conscious intention to be fair and unbiased": even if subjects were told before the experiment to avoid biased actions, they continued to perform them. It is not clear, to what class of cognitive phenomena the implicit attitudes must be attributed: whether they are something different from beliefs (Gendler’s “aliefs” (Gendler 2008a, 2008b)), a species of beliefs (Schwitzgebel 2010), or sui generis phenomena (Levy’s “patchy endorsements” (Levy 2015)). The choice is important for the relation between implicit attitudes and agency. One possible conclusion of the analysis of these cases is skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. The features of implicitly biased behavior, as Levy suggests (Levy 2017), are incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Implicit bias is one kind of implicit attitudes. The arguments concerning this type of behavior can be generalized to a broader class of actions. Another option is an optimistic position, defended by Vargas: the implicit bias cases can stimulate us to develop a better theory of agency and moral responsibility. 1. Gendler, T. S. (2008a). Alief in action (and reaction). Mind & Language, 23(5), 552–585. 2. Gendler, T. S. (2008b). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105(10), 634-663. 3. Levy, N. (2015). Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsement. NOUS, 49(4), 800– 823. 4. Levy, N. (2017). Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 94(1), 3-26. 5. Norton, M. I., Joseph A. V., and John M. D. (2004). Casuistry and social category bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 817–831. 6. Payne, B. K. (2006). Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6), 287–291. 7. Schwitzgebel, E. (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or The Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 531-553. 8. Uhlmann, E. L. & Cohen, G. L. (2005). Constructed criteria: Redefining merit to justify discrimination. Psychological Science, 16(6), 474-480. 9. Vargas M. (2017). Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology. in: D. Shoemaker, ed., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.