ИСТИНА

Phenomenal consciousness exists and illusionism serves very well to understand this. Illusionism could be presented as disqualification and debunking of phenomenal consciousness. The disqualification mostly relies on a criticism towards direct and infallible access to consciousness. It is possible that an agent could be fallible about phenomenal consciousness. Direct and infallible access implies that such situations are impossible. The notion of phenomenal consciousness is incoherent. illusionism is a necessity thesis. The debunking of consciousness: there could be creatures without phenomenal consciousness but with phenomenal beliefs. In that case an explanation of these beliefs doesn't rely on phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is debunked. The debunking argument doesn't say that phenomenal consciousness necessarily does not exist. Illusionism is a contingent thesis. The necessity thesis should be prefered over the contingent one because disqualification is a basis for debunking. My point is that illusionism is true in all worlds in a sense that it is impossible for illusionists to speak of a world with phenomenal consciousness because when a zombie (who ironically happens to be an illusionist) says “there is a possible world with phenomenal consciousness “ it has the same flavor as a blind person says “there is a possible world with green color “. I agree that it is a bad idea to defend the existence of phenomenal consciousness referring to acquaintance or to direct access because we just come to “a clash of intuitions “ between people who accept it and who don’t. But illusionists simply don’t talk of direct access. If we look at their examples the kind of knowledge there is clearly indirect. It is a common feature of indirect knowledge to have a space for a mistake. If we try to generalize the ontological strategy of disqualifying phenomenal consciousness we will come to paradoxes like there are no external objects as well as external world because we could make mistakes about external objects. We can totally “debunk “ the external world. It seems impossible to provide a form of argument for the existence of the external world that illusionists demand for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. I’m sympathetic to Moore's account of the existence of the external world when he shows deep problems with the rejection of the external world or being skeptical of it. It works well with phenomenal consciousness since illusionists demonstrate the needed understanding of phenomenal consciousness. The denial of the existence of phenomenal consciousness has the price that cannot be paid. Still realists about phenomenal consciousness are not able to tell how they know about it. But they are able to tell why they clearly know that it exists although still struggling with the “how “ question. Imagine for a moment that this consideration is right. Then I think that the existence of phenomenal consciousness is a real axiom in consciousness studies and of our basic ontological attitudes, and in order to prove this it is not necessary to solve the unsolvable task of giving grounds to direct access, acquaintance, revelation or something like this. Keywords Phenomenal consciousness, illusionism, qualia, external world