The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine in German Propaganda in the Crimea, 1941–1944

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Why did antisemitic propaganda continue in specific localities long after the Jews had been exterminated there? Relying on a case study of the Crimea, the following survey addresses this and other little-researched questions, such as how propaganda fit into the occupation regime’s division of labor and how the German administration organized the means of mass information; why some antisemitic canards were emphasized and others downplayed; the balance between local and central information sources; and the role of collaborationist intellectuals. The author considers the long-term influence of Nazi propaganda on its intended audiences.

Historiography

It is widely known that antisemitism was a basic component of Nazi propaganda in the occupied territories. How antisemitic doctrine was adapted to specific circumstances of the Crimea—how the “Jewish pawn” was exploited—demonstrate the importance of the Jews in Nazi plans even when few or no living Jews remained in a given territory.

In each region the German forces carried out a differentiated policy dependent on local situations and conditions, the strategic interests of the occupiers, the ethnic composition of the population, and other factors. Propaganda was one instrument of this policy, promoted via the means of mass information in place before the arrival of the occupying forces or created by them.

In analyzing the means of mass information under the Nazis, anyone researching the Holocaust confronts a number of fundamental issues: First, to what extent can newspapers and other means of mass information serve as sources on actual events?; to what extent are genuinely occurring processes—the spoliation of the Jewish community, its economic exploitation, the roundup and annihilation of the Jews, the hunting down of Jews in hiding—portrayed in them? Second, to what degree (if at all) did the means of mass information constitute an instrument in the occupiers’ arsenal of murder?; did propaganda incline former neighbors to close their doors in
the face of Jews in their moment of need, or even to betray them to the Nazis? Third, to what degree was the occupiers’ propaganda imported from Germany and to what degree tailored locally?; were there nationalist forces in the multiethnic Crimea, as in other regions, who cooperated with the occupiers, and did the “Jewish Question” concern them in their activities?

Another, broader question requires clarification. The Jewish population of the Crimean cities had already been wiped out as of the end of December 1941, that is, within the first month or two after the seizure of the peninsula, with the exception only of Sevastopol, where anti-Jewish operations were executed almost immediately after the fall of the city in early July 1942. Thus the basic objective of the persecution had been accomplished. Paradoxically, however, intensive antisemitic propaganda was carried out in the peninsula right up to the lifting of the occupation in April 1944. Why did the “new masters” squander such effort on a problem solved by the third month of the occupation? What did they achieve by apparently wasting space in newspapers or air time in radio broadcasts? Was this propaganda carried out “by inertia” (in other territories at least there was the rationalization that some Jews had been permitted to live for a certain time)? Or did Nazi antisemitic propaganda nonetheless follow rational goals? Was doctrine designed to influence the non-Jewish inhabitants as part of a policy exploiting national differences? Was “the Jewish card” thus being used in a bigger propaganda game? I address these and other questions below.

Western historiography has contributed numerous general studies of antisemitic doctrine in Nazi propaganda inside Germany. But doctrine and propaganda took on a qualitatively different appearance in the occupied eastern territories, conditioned by the ideological nature of the war, the specifics of military operations, and the objectives of the occupation regime. Of course, any regional study must draw on general studies dealing with the formation, role, mechanisms, and results of Nazi propaganda. And yet we have no comprehensive study of the propaganda of the aggressors in the occupied Soviet territories, or of their promotion of antisemitic doctrine in particular. American and Israeli scholars have attempted to describe the mechanisms and the forms of antisemitic propaganda in individual occupied Soviet regions, as well as specific aspects of antisemitic propaganda. The 1990s saw the evolution of a new post-Soviet historiography. A mass of previously inaccessible sources (chiefly periodical literature appearing under the occupation) was opened to investigators in the former Soviet archives. This led to the publication of studies containing examinations of the methodology and organization of propaganda in the occupied regions as well as of general propaganda doctrines oriented toward the local population. As a rule authors touch on antisemitic doctrine, but they have not examined it in depth.

At the same time historians have begun to focus attention on aspects of occupation policy related to specific national groupings. In 1997 the Russian Holocaust Center initiated a database of antisemitic items that had appeared in the periodical
press in various cities of occupied Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Regional studies were published by S. Zhumar (Minsk), V. Nikitenkov (Brest), Yu. Smilianskaia (Kiev), D. Olekhnovich (Daugavpils), O. Pashinova (Dnepropetrovsk), F. Riabchikova (Lutsk), A. Goncharenko (Pereiaslav-Khmelnitskii), and other investigators. Zh. Kovba’s monograph on the conduct of the local population in Eastern Galicia analyzes antisemitic items in Ukrainian, Polish, and German newspapers and the degree of their influence on readers. Recent works describe antisemitic newspaper articles, trace the role of local collaborators, and study the exploitation of antisemitic clichés specific to particular localities. Most, however, pay little attention to the machinery of propaganda or the role in it of particular German agencies; researchers generally limit themselves to describing newspaper content and, in particular, antisemitic articles. A summary of the methods and forms of antisemitic propaganda in various occupied areas of the USSR is contained in I. A. Altman’s overview of the Holocaust there. The machinery and content of German propaganda in the Crimea are treated in an article by O. V. Romanko. A study by V. N. Gurkovich deals with the journalist A. I. Buldeev, who collaborated with the German authorities in the Crimea.

Organization of the Means of Mass Information in Occupied Crimea

A considerable number of periodicals appeared under the Crimean occupation. These included the newspapers Deutsche Krim Zeitung (German Crimea Newspaper); Golos Kryma (Voice of the Crimea), Simferopol; Feodosiiskii vestnik (Feodosiya Herald); Evpatoriiskie izvestiia (Evpatoria News)—renamed Osvobozhdenie (Liberation) in August 1943; Sakskie izvestiia (Saki News); Zemledelets Tavridy (The Tauride Farmer), Simferopol; Yuzhny Krym (Southern Crimea), Yalta; Vestnik Kerchi (The Kerch Herald); and the journal Sovremennik (The Contemporary), Simferopol. In the Crimean Tatar language the authorities published the newspaper Azat Kirim (Liberated Crimea) in Simferopol. It is not clear whether a journal called Ana Yurt (Native Hearth) was ever actually published in Simferopol in 1943 and perhaps later. A more complete listing of the Crimean newspapers appears in Appendix I. (The Russian Holocaust Center’s list of periodicals published in the entire occupied USSR totals approximately four hundred.)

Crimean newspapers were formally publications of the city administrations. These were collaborationist institutions that lacked independence and whose only purpose was to “breathe life” into the decrees of the German military administration. The brochure Measures Enacted by German Authorities in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the USSR (published by the Main Intelligence Agency of the Red Army in Moscow in 1943) notes that the supervisory boards of the large cities consisted of a number of departments (the brochure lists eighteen). One of them, Education, was broken down into subdivisions: schools, libraries, theater and cinema, and propaganda and the press.
The editorial boards of newspapers were also directly, if informally, subordinate to the occupational administration (specifically the city commandants) and to the propaganda offices that it included. In practice these were usually propaganda detachments of the Wehrmacht.

Although the Crimea was formally under General Commissariat “Krim” (occasionally also “Taurien”) of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, real power on the peninsula remained in the hands of the military authorities. The Crimean media were under the operational control of field offices of the German Armed Forces Propaganda Branch (Wehrmachtpropaganda-Abteilung). The branch had been created in Berlin in 1937 to coordinate the activity of the propaganda organizations of the German armed forces with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda. In April 1941 a special Section WP IV was created within the staff of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch for work in the soon-to-be-invaded Soviet territories.19 As Goebbels wrote in his diary on May 25, 1941, war with the USSR would require thirteen propaganda companies (Propaganda Kompanien).20 By mid-1942 such Wehrmacht propaganda units employed about 15,000 personnel, including professional journalists, radio reporters, photographers, movie camera operators, and interpreters. Their mission included indoctrination of the civilian population, work with Soviet prisoners of war, and forwarding to Berlin information about events in the occupied territories.21

Working under the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch, the propaganda companies also liaised with Section “Ic” (the tactical intelligence department) on the staff of the army, in whose zone of authority they were located.22 In the Crimea this meant the Eleventh Army staff.23 We learn from a November 1941 report on the activities of the Ic Section of the Eleventh Army’s staff in Simferopol, for example, that the section had established direct contact with the 649th Propaganda Company.24

The propaganda units were also organized along territorial lines. For example Propaganda Section U (Propaganda-Abteilung U) was responsible for implementing propaganda activity in occupied Ukraine. By 1942 it had been broken into several subunits: Section U1 in Zaporozhe, Section U2 in Simferopol, and so on.25 These departments reported their actions to Propaganda Section U, which sent monthly summaries to the Wehrmacht Propaganda-Abteilung in Berlin. Overall, around 9 percent of the propaganda the Wehrmacht teams distributed to the civilian population in the East focused on antisemitic themes.26

The Wehrmacht’s propaganda units also cooperated with Goebbels’s Ministry of Propaganda. Despite not having the right to give them orders, Goebbels not infrequently tried to put their work under the control of his ministry.27 Thus on August 2, 1941, the Propaganda Ministry sent the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch Goebbels’s “Directives Pertaining to the Work of Propaganda Sections and Detachments in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union.” These instructions envisaged an “Active Propaganda,” Press, Radio Broadcasting, Cinema, and Culture groups. Goebbels wanted control over content to remain in the Ministry of Propaganda, with only
implementation assigned to the Propaganda Branch of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Armed Forces) and thence further down the chain of command. Local propaganda units were to report not only to the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch but also to the Ministry of Propaganda.  

Another structure employing propaganda specialists was Einsatzgruppe D. The Einsatzgruppen were SS and police formations subordinate to the Reich Main Office for Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA). Their tasks included the mass murder of civilians. The RSHA and the Ministry of Propaganda agreed in November 1941 to include several consultants and editors from the latter on the staff of the Einsatzgruppen. In March 1942 three such propaganda specialists were posted to the staff of Einsatzgruppe D in Simferopol: Obersturmführer (first lieutenant) Meissner, Untersturmführer (second lieutenant) Schroer, and Rottenführer (corporal) Matthies. As were the propaganda companies, these new SS specialists were still required to accept guidance from the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch.

**Antisemitic Content in Golos Kryma**

Let us take a closer look at Golos Kryma (hereafter, GK), the largest circulation periodical published in the Crimean administrative center of Simferopol. This newspaper was directed at the largest segment of potential readers, ethnic Russians, the majority of the population of occupied Crimea. The first of the 338 issues of GK came out on December 12, 1941, the last on April 9, 1944. Output (if not necessarily circulation) over this period grew from 3,000 to as high as 80,000. The retail price of the paper was one ruble or ten pfennigs. The editors were V.V. Popov (until the end of March 1942), A.I. Buldeev (until October 31, 1943), and K.A. Bykovich (until publication ceased).

Since the Nazis tolerated no independence of expression, we should not draw too sharp a distinction between newspapers that were essentially German (such as Deutsche Krim Zeitung) and those that were the work of local collaborationists, such as GK. As I will demonstrate later, although GK’s authors were indeed local journalists, they were realizing a model laid out by German ideologues.

In the pages of GK we can count a total of about two hundred antisemitic items, that is, articles, announcements, essays, satirical pieces (counting items in which Jewish themes were the focus or a significant though subordinate feature). These do not include the many more items containing antisemitic phrasing (“Jew-Bolsheviks,” “Yid-Bolshevism,” and the like) but that were wholly focused on other topics (military operations, life in the occupied territories, political events). By any calculation, however, this was a lot. As the Orientation Handbook for Printed Materials Published in the Crimea During the Temporary Occupation, compiled in 1946 by an employee of the Central State Archives of the Crimean Republic, states, “Materials of an antisemitic (about 25 percent) and agitational propagandistic nature take up a very large amount of column space.”
The pages of GK do not even allude to Holocaust events taking place in the Crimea at the time. The first issue came out the day after the mass shooting of Simferopol Jews and Krimchaks on December 12, 1941 (the Krimchaks were an ethnic group composed in late medieval and early modern times of subsequent Jewish immigrations; they assimilated Crimean Tatar language and customs but continued to practice a form of Judaism). A speech by Hitler’s titled “The Common Front of Europe” appeared as a front-page editorial with subheadings such as “The Jews—Incendiaries of the World” and “Bolshevism and Jewry.” Though in any case the paper would not have directly referred to the slaughter of the previous day, inclusion of the editorial was evidently intended to persuade the readership that the murder of a significant part of the city’s population was justified. Meanwhile, the Holocaust continued in the rural areas of the Crimea until mid-1942, and there were killings of children of mixed marriages in Simferopol in the summer of 1942, but no echo of these events appeared in GK. There were not even orders to “surrender” people in hiding, just as nothing was written about the punishments meted out to those caught hiding them.

Only a small number of indirect sources obliquely refer to these occurrences. With them, one could only guess at what was happening in reality. For instance, on page 2 of the January 29, 1942, issue, a notice “From the Office of the City Commandant” explained that a citizen had broken into a sealed Jewish apartment and taken some worn clothing and other objects. The March 5, 1942, issue carried a notice about the renaming of streets and alleys in Simferopol, among them Yevreyskii pereulok (“Jewish Alley”), which got the new name of Passazhgasse (Passage Alley). Somewhat later they did the same for Krymchakskii pereulok, or Krimchak Alley. How much could readers intuit from such tidbits? Despite the informational character of the paper (regulations and notices to the civil population often appeared), its role in regard to the “Jewish Question” was exclusively propagandistic.

**Antisemitic Canards**

In the process of analyzing publications focused on Jews, I discovered the need to identify singular semantic blocks within the framework of which some illumination of the “Jewish Question” has occurred. Nearly all claims against the Jews can thus be reduced to a few general theses, each of which might vary according to concrete circumstances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Jews dominate politics, having wormed their way into party and government posts. The Soviet regime represents “Yid Bolshevism.”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>Jews have polluted other races and nations. Jews are subhuman.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Jews are a nation of Christ-killers. They are sorcerers, minions of the devil, and performers of demonic rituals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Jews dominate social and cultural life. Through ideology they undermine the peoples around them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Economic</td>
<td>Jews dominate the economy, especially finance, commerce, and consumer supply.</td>
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Not all published items jibe neatly with one of the compartments listed above. Occasionally various clichés were combined in a single feature; the same article might be matched with different approaches to the “Jewish Question.” I will track and explain the approaches used most often by Nazi propagandists and their local collaborators in the Crimea. The most frequently encountered antisemitic motif conveyed to the readers of GK was characteristic of that employed in other conquered areas of the USSR. This was the thesis of the inseparability of the Jews and Bolshevism, and it was used everywhere for all it was worth: the Jews invented Marxism; Bolshevism was the contemporary tactical manifestation of Jewry; Yid-Bolsheviks were exploiters of the Russians and other peoples; and the like. On June 5, 1941, Goebbels recorded in his diary his idea for the proper approach to propaganda during the coming war with the USSR: “No anti-socialism, no restoration of tsarism. Do not come out openly in propaganda advocating the total defeat of the Russian Empire. . . . [Speak out] against Stalin and the Jews behind him. . . . A sharp indictment of Bolshevism; stigmatize its instability in all areas of life.” Insofar as most potential readers were ethnic Russians, the same scheme that was used with respect to the basic target group in the occupied Soviet republics was adopted by the Goebbels agency in the Crimea—one that was flexible in its use of concrete tactical methods. The key concept of the greater part of the publication was to contrast the small Bolshevik parasitical elite, consisting of Jews, with the deceived and exploited Russian majority. (as distinct, perhaps, from regions of the Ukraine where the press declared “Yids” the enemies not so much of the Russian people as the Ukrainian; in some places they were the enemies of Ukrainian statehood, and the “Yid-Bolshevik” had a clearly pronounced anti-Russian hue). Most of the antisemitic items in GK made the same political identification of Jews with Bolshevism.

Let us investigate how the standard doctrine was adjusted to take into account local nuances, and how any local peculiarity of Jewish life provided the occasion for new inventions. Indicative in this regard is an item in the April 16, 1942, issue of GK, authored by “Alpha” and titled “Jewish Republic in the Crimea.” The story presents a variation on the theme of the Jewish agricultural settlements established on the peninsula in the 1920s and 1930s:

They wanted to make the Jews as well-off as they could. . . . So they knocked a hole especially for Jews in the impenetrable wall that had zealously kept the peoples of the Union from contact with the outside world. A huge surge of aid streamed through the breach from foreign Jews headed by Agro-Joint [American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee]. Jews from everywhere seemingly outdid one another in supporting their co-religionists. As early as 1934 opulent Jewish colonies were established, having nothing in common with the poverty-stricken kolkhozes [collective farms] reserved for the rest of the Cremean population.

Despite the enormous opportunities they enjoyed, the Jewish colonies did not come close to the flourishing conditions that were expected of them. The hearts of this predatory
people did not lie in agriculture. Jews were drawn to the city and the prospects it offered of easy, abundant profit. . . . At the beginning of the war the entire ruling summit of the trade apparatus, the entire leading apparatus of local light industry consisted almost exclusively of Jews. . . . Arrogant and brazen . . . , indiscriminate in the means they chose to accomplish their aims, making use of their official position primarily to serve their own personal interests and those of their co-religionists, the Jews cared little for the welfare of the region, the struggle for which they had so ardently advocated in meetings and in the press.

The fact that a portion of the Jewish population had engaged itself in agriculture contradicts the well-known antisemitic stereotype. But it was conveyed in such a way that its positive meaning was lost, suggesting to unsuspecting readers that even the Communist Party was powerless to change the Jews. Nevertheless, other national groups had to sacrifice for the experiment, i.e., by giving up the land on which the Jews were settled. The reader receives the whole prefabricated set of stereotypes: hypocrisy, duplicity, conspiracy, the striving for easy profit, and the like.

Not that this was necessarily the most persuasive approach, inasmuch as the mass of Soviet citizens was not acquainted with Nazi theories in general and in particular not in relation to the Jews. Some German propagandists, for example the Baltic German V. Strick-Strickfeld, a staff officer with Army Group Center, called attention to this. In a memorandum titled “The Russians” that he sent to the Wehrmacht supreme command, Strick-Strickfeld stated, “Russians by nature are not chauvinists. Hatred on national grounds is not widespread among Russians. Russians are also unfamiliar with antisemitism from a racial point of view, although they draw a sharp line between themselves and the Jews.” Soviet citizens had been misled by Soviet propaganda before and at the beginning of the war, which told them that Hitler’s teachings presented Germans as the master race, and that the Slavs and everyone else, including the Jews, were inferior. “His most vicious hatred,” stated Pravda (reprinted in Krasnyi Krym, or “Red Crimea”) on July 17, 1941, “is and was nourished by the racist monster Hitler for the Slavic peoples. . . . In the opinion of this fiend, the lowest of all the races is the Slavic.”

The majority of items relied on a more or less uniform set of antisemitic canards—ones the Nazis had inherited from modern European culture and that rested on political and (less frequently) racial reasoning. At the same time, part of the occupied population, especially the older generation, held to a religious worldview. The occupiers had propaganda goals in mind when they underscored the “renaissance” of the church and its role in the life of the people. Raising the status of the church brought the added benefit of making it possible to exploit Christian anti-Judaism. For example, on December 10, 1943, under the section heading of “From the Old Russian Past” and bearing the title “Crucifixion of Christian by Yid (1096),” a GK article recounted the story of Saint Evstratii Postnik (the Faster, a thirteenth-century monk from Kiev’s Monastery of the Caves), captured by the nomadic
Polovtsy and sold to a Jew from Korsun who then crucified the captive. For whatever reason, only a small number of such items appeared.

Periodically GK reconfigured the arsenal and mobilized elements of the Judeophobic mentality with roots going back to the Middle Ages, when antisemitism was neither racist nor political, but rather a religious-folkloric phenomenon. The medieval image of the “alien” was inevitably associated with Jews and suggests a sense of the demonic: the Jew as a sorcerer, as an accomplice of the devil, as an infernal figure—reflecting the gulf that separated the religious convictions and the ritual practices of Judaism from those of the surrounding majority. It was to this layer of consciousness (the remnants of which can be observed in many folk cultures to this day) that GK addressed itself. For example, the author of an article titled “Kosher Meat” appearing on March 15, 1944, told his readers:

“ritual slaughter, a right that Jews in all countries fight for stubbornly, has retained to this day a sense of religious sorcery. The shokhets appointed by the synagogue to carry out the deed are by no means simple butchers. On the contrary, they are servants of a cult, and this whole unholy ritual is accompanied by the reading of special prayers and incantations.”

We need to pay attention to the key words “sorcery” and “incantation” in this fragment, for they testify to attempts by Nazi ideologues to resuscitate the image of the “alien” that predominated in mass consciousness several centuries earlier, long before the appearance of social Darwinism and “scientific” racism.

Types of Features Published

The form in which antisemitic material was published varied widely. It appeared most often in analytical articles, essays, communications, notes, sketches, memoirs, articles calling for action, speeches, and satirical features. From time to time these were accompanied by cartoons. A majority were lead articles pretending to be analytical in character: “The Jewish Question,” “About the Jews,” “Jews in the USSR,” “America on Guard against Yiddism,” “Jewry and Marxism.” Usually some kind of informational pretext was used at the beginning of an article. This might be an event that had actually taken place and could be interpreted as a manifestation of Jewish global dominance, the worldwide Jewish conspiracy, or the like. For example, an editorial called “USSR—Bastion of the Yids” (GK, June 14, 1942, p. 1) begins with a reference to Solomon Mikhoels’s (chairman of the Jewish Antifascist Committee) speech at a demonstration in Moscow. Only the first two paragraphs in this twenty-two-paragraph article touched on the event itself. The rest of the editorial developed the ideas of the baleful influence of Jews on Russian culture, the Soviet Union as the “main political bulwark” of Jewry, and so forth.

Of course, speeches and articles by the main figures of the Reich were frequently printed. These included items by Hitler and Goebbels that either focused
on the Jewish Question or integrated antisemitic reasoning into items devoted to other issues or events. Short but frequent communiqués regarding Jews in European countries, the United States, and Palestine were regular features. Some representative examples of this type follow: “Anti-Jewish Demonstration in Tokyo,” “Struggle against Yids throughout France,” “Moroccan Sultan Protests against Privileges for the Yids,” “Bulgaria Deals Quickly with the Jews,” “England under the Heel of the Jews.” The first item of this sort, “No More Jewish Pharmacies in Bulgaria,” appeared on January 8, 1942, and the last one, “English ‘White Paper’ on Palestine Losing Its Force,” on March 29, 1944. The communiques never carried news about the killing of Jews. The most the reader ever learned dealt with anti-Jewish legislative measures, the confinement of Jews in ghettos and concentration camps, and deportations.46 The tone was never neutral, but was sympathetic to anti-Jewish actions and accompanied by pejoratively tinged headlines. The Nazis themselves looked upon the news not so much as information but another vehicle for propaganda. Items such as these constitute half of the total number of antisemitic items in GK. Aside from fulfilling informational purposes, they were supposed to bolster the impression that the struggle with Jewry was a matter of life and death and that it was progressing with enormous force over the whole world.

Unlike certain similar publications in other regions, GK gave out practically no information about the situation of the Jews in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union.47 The task of selecting content probably fell within the competence of the local editors, but (operating under superior restrictions and perhaps in any case fearing they would repel their readers) they refrained from communicating practical measures by which the “new masters” were implementing their antisemitic plans. The editors of GK seem to have preferred discussing the Jews as an abstract foe.

Antisemitic satirical features began appearing regularly in 1943.48 Historical sketches were favored, and sometimes figured in appeals to the patriotic feelings of the reader. Readers learned from an article on December 6, 1942 (“Yids in the Russian Past”) that “in no European country did the exploitative activity of the Jews extend over so many long centuries as it did in Russia. . . . The influence of the Yids quickly corrupted the Khazar state, which by the end of the ninth century was already losing its power.”

At times content was duplicated in the same issue of the paper. For example, the December 2, 1942, issue carried an item on page one headlined “The Torah Scrolls and Stalin” with an “analysis” of the message sent to Stalin by the Moscow Jewish community on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Soviet power. Turning the page, we find a short item titled “Hope in Jehovah. Yids Send Message to Stalin,” written in a different tone but exaggerating the same event. Such seemingly incompetent overkill probably can be explained by confusion in the editorial office, by the requirement to accept material from both civilian and military sources, or by
the fact that one of the items belonged to a local author and the other to a superior agency.

Sources of Material Published
The question of the authorship of articles is of no small importance. In the first year a significant number of items were published anonymously. Gradually the circle of GK authors expanded, and they began to sign their articles, although with pseudonyms and cryptonyms. After liberation the NKVD compiled a list (unfortunately far from complete) of GK correspondents giving both their names and pseudonyms (see Appendix 2). Verification of authorship, the subsequent fate of correspondents, and their motives in working for the occupiers are subjects for future research.

Only in rare cases did the antisemitic articles carry signatures, whether real names or pseudonyms (Appendix 3). Rarely did they offer clues to their actual authorship. This fact, as well as the absence of references to Crimean realities, suggests that the majority of these stories did not originate locally but arrived via channels, and that the editors adapted them superficially to local circumstances. An editorial of January 23, 1943, began, in part, with the following ecstatic passage: “Thank God the Crimea does not have any Jews, and we are firmly convinced that there will never be any in the future. It would be unforgivable, however, if we completely forgot about them.” The customary demagoguery about the mortal danger the Jews represented for the Russian people follows later in the article, linked in no special way to the Crimea. One can imagine the editor obediently printing such routine material from the “higher ups” and only tacking on a first few lines for the locals.

“The New Press,” an article in the March 4, 1943, issue of GK, serves as further evidence that the basic file of stories was not written locally. The article was jubilant over the appearance on the newsstands of the paper Melitopol’skii Kray (Melitopol Territory), edited by B. Shiryaev, a captain in the so-called Russian Liberation Army. The article complains about the problems faced by newspapers in the occupied areas. “We have now only those individual former Russian journalists who happen to still be around. Given the lack of journalists, the situation of the press is extremely difficult. . . . That is why we so appreciate any halfway decent paper that has been patched together in these thankless circumstances when there are no people and insufficient technical resources.” Characteristically, not even here did the author neglect to fire a parting antisemitic shot: “We do not condemn all former Soviet journalists to the last man . . . , but all the same, Soviet journalists were primarily Yids and Russians who sold themselves to the Yids.”

The number of stories thematically focused on Jews in the Crimea and the “malignancy” they carried was likewise small, only four, and of these three played variations on the same tune, the allegedly unsuccessful Jewish agricultural labor experiment. The other articles depicted an image of Jews who were not “here,” but
“over there”: in the historical past, in the Kremlin, behind the Soviet rear lines, in America, in other parts of the world. . . . This, too, could indicate that most of the material was not of local origin.

One way to facilitate propaganda work in the occupied territories was to prepare specialists from the local population. For this purpose a network of schools (camps) was established in Germany and in the occupied territories. These undertook the training of promising locals as well as prisoners of war of anti-Soviet orientation. Several schools were established under the aegis of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, and included camps in Kielce (Poland), Wutzetz (Germany), Utrata (Poland), and Ruheleben (Germany). Others were set up by the Abwehr (German military intelligence) in Ibbenbüren and Münster (Germany); by the Abwehr, in cooperation with the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch, in Wulheide and Dabendorf (Germany); and by the Abwehr, in cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda, in Zittenhorst and Wustrau (Germany). Many graduates of such schools and courses were assigned to the occupied territories, where they served in the propaganda apparatus or even as burgomeisters.

Another way of supporting the local propaganda apparatus was by publishing compendiums of materials written in advance for distribution in the provinces. There were several sources. One study concluded that propagandists in zones under military administration obtained materials from the Propaganda Branch of the OKW, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Reich Propaganda Section of the Nazi Party. In the same way political and military information appearing in newspapers in Galicia arrived in a bulletin released throughout the General Government by the German State Information Agency “Telepress,” located in Cracow.

Let us examine in greater detail one of the collections of prefabricated articles that were produced in Berlin. On site, staff had only to send articles to the printer. This saved them from continually racking their brains over how to “correctly” write about this or that event at the front, in Germany, or in the occupied eastern territories. In September 1943 the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army captured a set of bulletins that the Berlin Press Agency had produced for Russian-language newspapers. The bulletins were issued in 1942 and 1943 and bore the notation Ostraum-Artikeldienst—roughly, Eastern Area Article Service. Section Ost of the Ministry of Propaganda was responsible for publishing the bulletin. As the cover letter (by an officer of the Red Army’s Main Political Administration) to the Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Communist Party Central Committee explained, “Obviously the materials in the bulletin are widely used in newspapers; indeed, they fill up the papers almost completely. The editor of the bulletin is Willm [sic] Stein, former press attaché of the German Embassy in Moscow.” Unfortunately, the set is incomplete; only thirty-six issues for 1942 and twenty-three for 1943 survive. (They had appeared no less frequently than once every four or five days.) Thirty-two of the fifty-nine available issues contain antisemitic content.
The anti-Jewish items in the bulletins are diverse. They are articles of a general nature about the allegedly baleful influence of Jews on Russian and world history, short informational communiqués on the situation of Jews in various parts of the world, and cartoons depicting the leaders of the USSR and its allies as minions of world Jewry. These materials were actively employed at the local level. Here are some representative borrowings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Item, Headline</th>
<th>Publication in Ostraum Artikeldienst</th>
<th>Publication in Golos Kryma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News item: “Law Regarding Yids in Slovakia”</td>
<td>No. 9, February 13, 1942, p. 44.</td>
<td>April 5, 1942, p. 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article: “Masonry, the Enemy of All Nations”</td>
<td>No. 16, March 13, 1942, p. 33.</td>
<td>April 5, 1942, p. 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article: “A Race without a Conscience Doesn’t Deserve Pity”</td>
<td>No. 19, 1942 [from approx. April 1942 date no longer appears], p. 76.</td>
<td>May 7, 1943, pp. 2–3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of factors might explain the infrequency of direct reprinting that I identified. For one, the borrowing certainly was indirect, that is, materials from the bulletin were printed in GK only after a certain amount of revision by the editors. Revisions needed to be carried out in an understandable effort to give the newspaper “its own personality.” And of course, since not all issues of the bulletin survived it is not possible to construct a complete comparison.

It is interesting that this process of distributing material also worked in reverse. The most striking stories in the local press were ferreted out by the staff of the propaganda company and sent to Berlin, where they were evidently transmitted from the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch to the Ministry of Propaganda. There they were somewhat revised and then circulated by way of the bulletin so that the most usable local materials had a chance to get to readers in other regions. The following recounts an example: As mentioned above, on April 16, 1942, GK published an article called “Jewish Republic in the Crimea.” It would seem people paid attention since, even though it was cooked up with open distortions of fact, it had been written in a dynamic and professional (if we can use that word) manner. Bulletin 32 of Ostraum Artikeldienst, dated June 26, 1942, contained an article under the title of “Jewish Settlements in the Crimea.” It looks as though the editor in Berlin trimmed the Crimean article and threw out the most undesirable assertions (for example, about the Crimean Tatar Republic), and somewhat revised the original thesis by contrasting the Jews not with the Crimean Tatars (which would have been incomprehensible...
and useless to a non-Crimean reader) but with German colonists “who with their hard work and organizational skills contributed to the development of the culture and prosperity of the Crimean peninsula” (i.e., before the Revolution). But the point of the article remained the same: even under favorable circumstances Jews were incapable of agricultural labor. The article allowed propagandists to encourage a well-known antisemitic prejudice on the basis of allegedly proven fact.

The personal views of the editor and other journalists could not but leave their imprint, and yet little is known about the GK editors’ feelings on the Jewish Question (in particular those of A. Buldeev). It is certainly highly unlikely that any tried to moderate the Judeophobic tenor of the publication. On August 16 and 17, 1944, Simferopol resident E. E. Gopshtein, a survivor of the Holocaust, testified before the Commission on the History of the Great Fatherland War:

> The editors had a girl who was a simple technical employee sitting in the office of the deputy editor . . . carefully copying from the diary of the writer Dostoyevsky, which had antisemitic statements, then from the pages of Suvorin, Rozanov, and Shmakov. These were pretty thick books, and for days on end the girl copied this material for use in articles by Bykovich and others.

This suggests that at least part of the matter was written on local initiative. Materials of this kind were indeed published: in the June 14, 1942, issue we find a long article, “Jews and Russian Literature” (I. Gorskii, author); in the July 2, 1943, issue an article by V. Kovylev, “Russian Poets and Their Views of the Jews”; and in the July 23, 1943, issue an essay by “Z. F.” called “Prophets of the Jewish Revolution,” about the antisemitic views of writers, poets, and publicists. Only three local authors (I. Aleksandrov, Krymov, and V. Fedorov) included their bylines in antisemitic articles, and these are the only ones whose real surnames can be verified (A. Buldeev, K. Bykovich, and S. Gavrilov, respectively).

Along with the “vertical” scheme under which materials for publication trickled down from German agencies above, it would seem that horizontal links also figured, newspapers of different regions supplying one another with material. Newspaper editors probably exchanged experiences when they traveled from one territory to another, just as their papers received information from each other through regular channels or as occasion permitted. To take only one example, on December 8, 1943, the Russian-language Odessa daily _Molva_ reprinted without change the GK article (mentioned above) “The USSR—Bastion of the Yids” (this time it appeared under the name—or pseudonym—of A. Rusov, known to us from GK). One might draw the conclusion that the papers took the piece from the same German source, but the article appeared in _Molva_ a full year and a half (!) after Simferopol, and two days later (no. 306) _Molva_ reprinted a sketch by GK’s editor A. Buldeev, “The Tatar Poet Choban-Zade.” One could cite many similar examples. It would be logical to assume that GK in its turn borrowed materials from other occupation periodicals.
In addition to the German propagandists and local collaborating journalists, yet a third, and quite small, group contributed to Nazi propaganda work: émigrés who returned with the occupation. To one degree or another these shared the convictions of the Nazis, and they carried out the new policies in the captured regions. It appears that they sometimes performed the role of intermediaries, adapting Berlin’s directives to local circumstances. E. E. Gopshtein tells about one of these officials, a man who directed work with the Crimean press for Section U2 in Simferopol and later worked for Propaganda Stab Krim:

It is hard to imagine the degree to which statements were polished and refined under the leadership of the German representative Maurach, who headed the propaganda office here. His father was a good doctor of optometry. In 1920 he left for Germany. . . . When Dr. Maurach died, the family found itself in difficult circumstances, and Maurach’s mother joined the fascist movement. Against this background the Maurach son was brought up in Germany and showed up here as the representative of the propaganda office. It is difficult to imagine the extent to which the son buried himself in this work.57

Target Audiences

One of the techniques that helped Goebbels’s acolytes maximize their results was targeting—not appealing to the entire audience in every article, but rather to specific groups or social layers. This meant finding the most responsive sector of the intelligentsia, youth, peasants, the religious, women. National groups were generally selected on the principle of “divide and conquer.” Thus the above-cited article about Jewish collective farms began, “In 1921 the Crimea was declared the Tatar Autonomous Republic”—a lie, since autonomy in the Crimea at that time was established not on the national, but the territorial principle: the official name was the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The “Tatar Autonomous Republic,” the author (“Alpha”) wrote, “became a fiction. Like a cancerous tumor, the Jewish republic appeared on its body and quickly grew.” It is possible to picture how this invention acted on the minds of poorly educated rural Tatars. (Below I examine an analogous statement in the Tatar-language press.)

GK targeted Christian believers with a January 18, 1942, article explaining how the leader of fascist Slovakia, the Catholic priest Dr. Josef Tiso, had “found a basis for his national-socialist worldview” in Christian philosophy: “The love for the nation that is an imperative of Catholic moral teaching not only expresses itself in defense of the interests of the nation, but also requires an active struggle with all harmful phenomena in the national organism. Jewry, which has suppressed the Slovaks politically, must be numbered among such phenomena.” Not surprisingly, the item fails to mention Tiso’s position as a puppet of Nazi Germany; it would have seemed better to give the impression that his were the views of an ordinary priest and man of the people.

A differentiated approach was also applied to the female readership. An item printed in the March 11, 1943, issue of GK—intentionally after International Women’s
Day, a holiday promoted under the Soviet regime—explained the “essence” of the holiday while underscoring the difficult position of women under Soviet power.

The Bolsheviks bragged to the whole world about the enactment of equal rights for women in the USSR. They even introduced the so-called International Day of the Woman, annually celebrated on the eighth of March. This showfront was supposed to propagandize the ‘dedication to humanity’ of Soviet power. The other side of this truly Yid coin is completely clear. The Jews, destroyers and seducers of the Russian nation, have done everything they could to kill the national life of the Russian people in all important spheres. . . . The noxious influence of Judaism is evident everywhere. It has to be said forthrightly that no kind of equal rights for women in the USSR ever existed.

A special approach was also adopted vis-à-vis the rising generation, GK publishing a supplement under the name Molodost’ (Youth). Though originally slated to appear on the newsstands monthly, only a few issues ever saw the light of day—the first one even used the same design as its “grownup” forebear. An early editorial defined the tenor: “Of course, all of us to one degree or another have ourselves experienced the influence of a system of anti-national education in the spirit of Yid snitching, careerism, and mutual distrust. But all the same we have maintained the traditions of our fathers and grandfathers throughout the Bolshevik chaos. Russian youth have not become Jewish youth.” Serving as an illustration of this was the gripping story of an eyewitness to the “Leningrad State University case,” in which anti-Soviet students were repressed because “Jews turned the guys in.”

Special attention was paid to the peasant population as well. A March 18, 1943, article in GK titled “In a Cossack Village” purported to expose the role of “Yid-Bolsheviks” as illustrated in the case of a settlement called Mangush. The article exploits the common principle of contrasting the happy life of the past with life under the influence of the “Yid-imposed Soviet yoke”:

By dint of stubborn, painstaking labor the peasants of Mangush earned their living, and they lived pretty well. . . . But the black day came. The Jews came to power, and with the Jews came collectivization. The rule of compulsion in the kolkhoz, the pitiful half-starving existence of the slave. The hereditary Cossacks and soldiers could not take it; they fought furiously for the rights of their grandfathers, but the Yid-Bolsheviks broke their resistance by deceit and violence.

In addition to the civil population, propaganda work was also conducted in collaborationist formations active in the Crimea. The schedule of lectures during one week in August 1942 for the Cossacks of the 11th Squadron, under the guidance of Sonderführer Petermann, included topics such as “The Situation on the Fronts,” “The Life and Personality of Adolf Hitler,” and “Bolshevism and the Destruction of the Peasantry.” The soldiers heard one lecture with the complex billing “The Artificial Isolation of the USSR from the Rest of the World. Bolshevism and the Jews. The Essence of Jewry.” Analogous sessions were held in mid-February 1942 in Simferopol for recently recruited Crimean Tatar collaborationist volunteers.
Antisemitic Propaganda and the “Non-Jewish Question”

From the point of view of the methodology of conducting propaganda, it is impossible not to be struck by how zealously antisemitic arguments were employed in the development of themes to which the “Jewish Question” had no apparent relevance. With the changing situation on the front lines, in the rear, and in Eastern policy generally, and with changes in civilian administration such as the phased implementation of agrarian reforms, the basic file of stories also changed. However, the antisemitic component continued through each new wave of stories, a kind of constant that linked thematically diverse currents. I will address this issue in the conclusion, but for now will limit the assessment to a few examples.

As the partisan movement in the Crimea had grown significantly by fall 1943 and early 1944, active anti-partisan agitation geared up in GK. The primary tack was to create in the minds of readers a negative image of the “bandits.” On January 16, 1944, for example, the paper printed a three-part feature called “Captured by the Bandits.” One part paints a repellent portrait of a Jewish woman with a partisan unit, “Female Yid with Rifle.” Conversely, when a campaign to recruit volunteers for the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) got underway, local functionaries, among them ROA Captain B. Shiriaev, used antisemitic rhetoric in their speeches. Stefan Zelenin published an account (GK, June 15, 1943) of Shiriaev’s speech in a Crimean theater on June 13, 1943, “The Russian Liberation Movement of General Vlasov.” Among his other promises the speaker averred, “We will fight until we have destroyed and pulled up by their roots all the Yids who tore our motherland apart.”

Antisemitic phraseology was also actively employed in counterpropaganda. The newspaper Krasnyi Krym (Red Crimea), which had been published on the peninsula before the war, continued to be printed behind Soviet lines and was dropped on the Crimea by air. It was well-known that the population avidly snatched up this publication. The authorities sought to neutralize any effect of Soviet propaganda. On March 25, 1943, GK complained, “now lurking somewhere in the back yard of the Soviet press, the mangy little rag Krasny Krym is ‘honorably’ continuing the glorious traditions of the Simferopol newspaper of the same name published under the Reds.” To drive the point home a GK feature article titled “The Plain Truth” (written by the staff author Aspid, or “the Asp”) pretends to recount the work of the editorial board of Krasny Krym, naming “Comrade Stepanov” and his obviously Jewish-named colleagues Monia, Abrasha, and Dora Izrailevna (the latter a typist).59

Other Print Media

Unfortunately, the incomplete sets of newspapers published in other cities of the Crimea do not permit so detailed an examination. Nevertheless, it is possible to make certain observations based on the individual copies that have survived. This task is facilitated by indirect sources such as reports of the German occupation authorities as well as documents produced by Soviet organizations in the first postwar days (the
Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Crimean Regional Party Committee for example).

All newspapers published antisemitic materials, and no substantive differences can be observed among them. The editors of Feodosiiskii vestnik (Feodosia Herald) used the traditional tactic of presenting its ideas and principles indirectly, as if it was reporting, rather than trying to generate popular opinion. The second issue (August 2, 1942) featured a letter to the editor by “Old Resident,” who expressed the hope that the paper “would be an advocate of truth and verity as distinct from the notorious Proletarii [The Proletarian, the pre-war Soviet paper] which had rendered praise to the minions of the Yids’ kahal that had deceived and oppressed Mother Russia.” The last paragraph condemned Jewry, “which all peoples have driven from their gates since the beginning of time” and pronounced “a curse on those who walk hand in hand with them.”

As GK, other papers were formally subordinate to city managers even though in practice their publication was normally organized by the city commandant’s office, A report of Field Commandant V (810) from Feodosia dated December 20, 1941, noted that “the newspaper in Feodosia will be published . . . under the direction of the Field Commandant’s office.” Under the masthead of the paper appeared the statement “Publication approved by the censorship authority of the Commandant’s Office of the City of Feodosiia,” or “Publication approved by the Commandant’s Office of the City of Evpatorii.”

The former editor of Evpatoriiskie izvestiiia, N. F. Sulima, told investigators after the liberation of the Crimea that the local commandant’s office in the person of Major Gansch and his deputies exercised the tightest control over the newspaper. Gansch had insisted on the most detailed coverage of agitation-propaganda questions (e.g., countering Evpatorii residents’ possible “incorrect interpretation” of the shooting of the city’s Jews at the end of 1941 and the killing of a major part of the male population in January 1942 in revenge for a Soviet raid) at the cost of reducing coverage of international events and even of life and events in Germany. Gansch’s successor, Major Otto Wielert, had also required the editor to “insert as much anti-Soviet and anti-Jewish material as possible”; the editor had had to obtain prior approval for the printing of each issue. On the first anniversary of its publication, December 30, 1942, the paper told its readers about its guiding principles, explaining to them that it “had been founded thanks to the exceptional cooperation of the local commandant’s office, [which] . . . supplies the editors with authoritative German sources,” and that “the Propaganda Department always works to help the newspaper.” The authors of the editorial spoke of difficulties such as “the almost total lack of its own correspondents,” but bravely assured readers that the paper would continue “to hold [to] a single path of principle—the path of passionate struggle against the accursed universal and worldwide foe—against Yid-Bolshevism.” That a mere three writers (as the paper let slip in the February 17, 1943, issue) could blaze
their own “principled path” sounds grandiloquent; the fact that only two of the antisemitic items in the paper were signed (“V. Karadzhinets” and “V. Maksyuk”) suggests that staff was borrowing almost 100 percent of what was printed.

The material came from several sources. According to the city commandant’s office in Saki, political and military information in Saksie Izvestiia was reprinted from GK; the editors got other articles from the German Press Department in Simferopol. Evpatoriiskie izvestiia (like GK) also used as one of its sources the above-mentioned Berlin bulletin Ostrau-Artikeldienst, to which the Evpatoriia city commandant’s office referred in a communication of March 16, 1942. N. Sulima testified about this at his interrogation: “I systematically obtained this publication from the local commandant’s office. The information it contained was published in the newspaper.” Besides this bulletin, intelligence was obtained through Wehrmacht channels and articles from the army newspaper Der Kampf (The Struggle). The same state of affairs prevailed in Feodosia. “For the most part information was sent [to Feodosiia vestnik] from Germany in Russian, and the local editor—the mayor in this case—cut these items out with a pair of scissors, put the articles together, published the newspaper, sold the papers for a ruble apiece, and put the money into his own pocket,” declared a Soviet official at a June 1944 post-liberation conference on propaganda and agitation.

We must comment separately on the Crimean Tatar press. Azat Kirim (Free Crimea), published in Tatar by the Simferopol Moslem Committee under the editorship of M. Kurtiev, focused considerable interest on the topic of the Jews. Its propaganda was part of wider attempts to attract the Crimean Tatars to the German side, to use Crimean Tatar units against the partisans, and possibly even to mobilize them to fight the Allies in the Middle East and thereby to win popular support among the Moslem population there. In the 1930s the Soviet authorities had smashed the last remnants of the Crimean Tatar national movement. To fan popular resentment of the Soviet regime was easy enough, and not surprisingly the newspaper presented the Soviet regime as having a Jewish profile. The above-mentioned project for the agricultural resettlement of Jews in the Crimea, for example, had not taken place in a political and territorial vacuum. In the mid-1920s, large numbers of landless Tatars from the southern, mountainous part of the peninsula had been laying claim to the vacant steppe lands of the northern part. Under Chairman V. Ibragimov of its Central Executive Committee, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic favored these claims. It was at this very moment that Moscow began to implement the project of settling Jewish migrants from Ukraine and Belorussia on these lands. A confrontation arose between, on the one hand, the leadership of KOMZET and OZET supported by the Communist Party Central Committee, and, on the other hand, the Central Executive Committee of the Crimea supported by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (hoping to attract the repatriation of tens of thousands of Tatars who had fled the Russian Empire for Turkey in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries). Ultimately the dispute ended with victory for the “Moscow line.” In 1928 Ibraigmov was arrested and shot, many other eminent Crimean Tatar nationalists falling victim to charges of “bourgeois nationalism.”

The Germans exploited this sensitive history, aided by representatives of the Tatar national intelligentsia who headed puppet administrative and cultural-educational structures on the peninsula. “Stalin obtained dictatorial power in Russia in return for selling the Crimea to the Jews,” as Azat Kirim wrote on March 20, 1942. And again, a year later, another example: “The Bolsheviks seized the most fruitful lands (342.5 thousand hectares) and settled the Jews on them” (July 16, 1943).

Reorganization of the Propaganda Effort

Beginning in fall 1942, propaganda on the peninsula entered a new spiral of development. In addition to GK and other print organs, the occupation authorities linked other vehicles for propaganda, seeking to influence minds at the movies, over the airwaves, and in the classroom.

The organizational side of the business underwent major change. In September 1942, by order of the high command of the German armed forces (in the Soviet document; probably OKW), the 2nd Platoon of the 695th Propaganda Company was transformed into Propaganda Staff Crimea of Propaganda Section Ukraine. It maintained its headquarters in Simferopol and “external offices” in Yalta, Evpatoriia, Dzhankoi, Kerch, and Feodosiia. Staff received guidance from Propaganda Department Ukraine, but had to coordinate it with orders of the commander in chief of the Crimea. The personnel roster included twenty-eight staff members, with Lieutenant Frei the staff director. The staff exercised review and oversight over the press, cinema, radio, cultural work among the population, and education. The organizational structure consisted of several functional branches: “Active Propaganda” (three staff members under Sonderführer Dr. Manz), “Culture” (two staff members under Sonderführer Rekk, who was also deputy staff director), “Press” (two including Sonderführer Maurach), “Cinema” (four members under Sonderführer Dr. Kühnemann), “Radio” (three including Sonderführer Scharnke), and so forth. As a rule branches worked closely together.

Throughout, antisemitic aims played the same central role. One of the Simferopol movie theaters showed the antisemitic feature film *Jew Süss* twice a day for two weeks in May 1943. The newspaper did not merely advertise the film’s title, but “a film about the eternal Jew, with documentary data.” A review by editor A. Buldeev (under the pseudonym of I. Aleksandrov) sought to steer viewers’ impressions along the desired track: “The multifaceted picture [that the German actor Ferdinand Marian] creates persuades the viewer that all of Stüss’s misdeeds are not the product of his personal will, not his own lapses of character, but the painstaking realization of the Jews’ fiendish overall program for the enslavement of all other, Christian peoples.”
The same line prevailed in radio broadcasting, partially restored in 1942. Fortunately, 1942/43 German Propaganda Department documents for transmission by radio have been preserved.76 These were periodically mailed under the title “Radiovestnik” (Radio Herald); the Crimea Propaganda Staff distributed them “to help broadcasting centers do independent transmissions from the studio.” Only a few issues have survived, but each contained a table of contents and texts to be aired, including regular antisemitic items. For example we cite from Radiovestnik no. 5, item 6, “Russian Youth, the Family, and Morality”: “Of course the diseases of the time are reflected in our youth. This could not have happened without the activity of Jewry [which wanted] ‘to destroy the influence of the family principle among non-Jews.’ This is the principle that guides them in their antipopular undertakings shot through with hatred for humanity.”77 The usual accompanying instructions urged that the text be read “in a persuasive, passionate tone of voice.” Here too we observe the close cooperation between branches: a significant number of the items have bylines familiar to us from GK. By the same token, the paper regularly published broadcast schedules. On page 4 of no. 42 (April 7, 1943), we read under “Program of Broadcasts” for the next day, “Thursday, April 8 at 1620. Broadcast of ‘The Jews’ from the series ‘Germany’s Victory—Freedom for the Peoples of Russia.’”

The occupiers also tried to organize their propaganda so that it appeared to come not only directly from the authorities, but also from institutions not formally identified with the power structure. Thus they tried to establish sway over the clergy, harnessing the shepherds to their own purpose of putting a Nazi stamp on the consciousness of the flocks. A fragment from the postwar testimony of Father Stefan Zholtikov, dean of the Cathedral of the Intercession in Sevastopol, illustrates this:

[In March 1943] I was called in by the SD [Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service]. . . . After the interrogation, Hammer, the chief of the SD, gave me the following order, that I should work in full contact with the German authorities and with the propaganda department. . . . I was able to avoid putting my signature to anything only because I declared that I was a servant of the altar, an apolitical person. In response to this declaration he slapped me in the face twice and said, “Weg, Scheisse!” [Out of here, shit!] whereupon I went home. . . . The mayor, Supryagin . . . urged me to arm the population with sermons against the Jews and communists. I answered him, too, that I was a servant of the altar, that my job was to preach the word of Christ. Supryagin answered me with threats to the effect that “If you won’t help with civil propaganda, the Germans will shoot you when they withdraw.”78

The Purposes of Antisemitic Agitation

The chief question of this study—the inhabitants of occupied Crimea probably asked it too—is what conceivable purpose it served to carry out such large-scale antisemitic propaganda if the Jews had long been annihilated. Altman singled out two possible reasons: 1) involving the local population in the search for those Jews still in hiding or in flight; 2) creating a special psychological climate against the background of which
the murder of an entire people was being carried out. In my view, these arguments supply only a partial explanation. If the Jewish community had continued to exist in the Crimea for a significant period under the occupation (as in some other regions of the occupied USSR) then the efforts of the propaganda machine might at least somehow have made more sense: they might then have facilitated (let us say) a more thorough registration of Jews, the more effective spoliation of their property, or more numerous denunciations of Jews in hiding. In such a case, propaganda might have played the role of a catalyst. One gets the impression, however, that the antisemitic component of the propaganda was carried out for its own sake, as a necessary supplement to other facets of propaganda work with more concrete goals. If an editor had free space in the galleys of a future issue it would not take him long to insert an antisemitic article into that space. This might be a bit of an oversimplification, and an antisemitic article would hardly have been placed in an issue in 1944 simply to justify the extermination two years earlier of one of the national groups on the peninsula. The reasons must be sought beyond the framework of the occupiers’ anti-Jewish policy itself.

The editors of GK evidently understood that anti-Jewish propaganda in the absence of the Jews was a paradox requiring clarification to the readers. The paper periodically recognized and rationalized the issue, as in its August 19, 1942, number:

Some Russian skeptics have doubts about the immediacy of the Jewish question. Why should we continue to beat this dead horse if the Jews have no way of mounting a threat to us here on territory liberated from the Bolsheviks? Why should we trouble ourselves to read long editorials in Golos Kryma that simply repeat thoughts already expounded by the paper? We have had to listen to this kind of critique from the lips of every sort of blockhead, people who are unscrupulous, who do not understand and are not capable of understanding the meaning of the universal, historical struggle taking place before our eyes between two irreconcilable races, the Aryan and the Jew. . . . How can we comfort ourselves with the thought that the Jews have no way of threatening us here when they rule like kings over there, in the enormous spaces of blood-soaked Russia?

But even this passage represents only part of an answer to our question. Out of it emerges a pathological hatred, fostered by state ideology, for an entire people stigmatized as the source of danger to the “superior race” and all who wished to think of themselves part of the latter. The passage likewise said that the war being fought was a war between two ideological systems, two worldviews, one of which the editors equated with “Jewry.” It did not matter that actual Jews did not exist any longer. The German propaganda machine required an enemy with an image, a “we” and a “they,” a dichotomized ideology such as has proven an inalienable attribute of all totalitarian systems. With the aid of an enemy existing somewhere “over there” even if not “here,” it was easier to distract the population from present reality with its heavy trials, its difficult economic situation, and the defeats of German troops at the fronts. A universally applicable paradigm, antisemitic doctrine was as useful in the
occupied Eastern territories as it was at home in Germany. If "they are not actually threatening us," the Jews could be made to embody for the reader a universal enemy, to make the reader subconsciously feel himself a part of a worldwide struggle, to identify his, his people’s, and his country’s goals with those of Germany. The believer was encouraged to think of himself as a participant in the struggle, even as a member of a fighting order.

And yet, on Soviet territory antisemitic doctrine acquired a set of peculiarities and tactical missions that flowed from the conditions in which it was applied: recall Krasnyi Krym’s anti-partisan image, “Female Yid with Rifle.” The occupiers understood that a major part of the population had been indoctrinated with communist and patriotic ideas, internationalism, a belief in social equality, and devotion to the head of the Soviet state. They understood that a new worldview, one defined by them, could supplant the former ideology only if the people realized that their pre-war social and political system had been wrong. This was a challenge for the Nazis, whose ideology was based on racist and nationalist values that applied only to the German nation, or perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, to the “Aryan races” (from which most Nazis excluded the Slavs). They could not contend with Soviet ideology per se; their way out was to ascribe a “Jewish” character to it and thus compromise its positive content in the eyes of the population, “to drive a wedge between the Soviet regime and the Soviet people.”

This tack was pursued in all the occupied territories, but to different degrees. In GK, for example, cartoons frequently depicted Stalin as a servant of Jewish capital, but this did not extend as far as a direct artistic attribution of an exaggerated Semitic appearance to the “father of the peoples”; the Nazis knew their limits. But in Latvia, for instance in the Daugavpils newspaper Devinskii Vestnik (Dvina Herald), or in Western Ukraine, in the Lvov newspaper Lvivski visti (Lvov News)—that is, in territories annexed by the USSR not long before the war and where Soviet ideological precepts had not had time to take root—cartoons of Stalin in the image of a Jew appeared regularly. All of this suggests that antisemitic propaganda had aims beyond the pragmatic lust of the Nazis to destroy the Jews physically. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the principal object of the anti-Jewish propaganda campaign in the Crimea was not so much the Jews as the remainder of the population.

Here is why antisemitic propaganda was the “political” motif, and why all other propaganda (“racial,” “religious,” and so on) needed to reinforce it. The latter played an auxiliary role; they were called upon to explain what it was that made Jewry “depraved,” whereas the “political” motif focused not so much on the Jews as on Soviet ideology and the Soviet political regime, to which the occupiers ascribed a Jewish and therefore vicious and alien character. We should add that local journalist-collaborators were also involved in the “political” anti-Jewish argumentation. Of these, the ones who harbored illusions of a free national life under the “new order” that proclaimed the “Russian national idea” likewise could not find a more effective
paradigm for discrediting the Soviet system: the “racial” line would have been inexplicable and alien to the average reader; the “economic” line would also not have provided a basis for speculation, as the Soviet economic system was not identified with private entrepreneurs (among whom Jews were to be found) but with the state; the “religious” line would not have enjoyed sufficient support inasmuch as the education of a major part of the readership was, under Soviet conditions, far removed from religion.

Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned tactical advantages, another existed. The constant vilification of any single national group was likely to leave the others with the illusion of security and a guarantee of future benevolent treatment. Unbeknownst to them, the Crimea occupied a special place in the plans of the Nazi leadership. At a staff conference on June 16, 1941, Hitler had declared “the Crimea must be liberated of all foreigners and settled by Germans.” On June 9, 1942, Himmler announced at a conference of SS and police chiefs that the war would not make any sense if the Crimea in particular were not completely colonized by Germans over the following twenty years.84 As long as the war was still underway and stability of the front was not guaranteed, therefore, the occupiers had no desire to sow suspicion among the “foreigners” who still inhabited the peninsula.

**Peculiarities of the Crimean Press**

If one surveys the press throughout the occupied Soviet territories, one may observe that the farther east we look, the weaker is the role of local collaborationists and the greater that of Germans themselves. As compared to Ukrainian publications in Cracow, L’vov, and even Kiev, the Russian-language media in the Crimea were not the product of ideological nationalist activity, for here there were almost no Russian nationalist figures with serious experience in political organization and activism. Locals became journalists here only under the Germans. The Soviet power had established itself here early, and anyone capable of bearing ideologies other than the official had been driven out at the beginning or sent to the Gulag or shot later. And now, because the Crimea remained in the front zone the military retained de facto authority and played a bigger role than any collaborationist institutions created by the indigenous population. For such reasons the Wehrmacht and its propaganda structures wielded more influence over the content and organization of mass information than did the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories or other civilian agencies. If, according to John-Paul Himka, the newspaper *Krakivs’ki visti* was really a Ukrainian newspaper and not a German newspaper published in a Ukrainian setting,85 the newspapers of the Crimea (despite all the material on Russia, the Russian people, and Russian history and culture) have to be seen as German newspapers published in a Russian context.

The version of antisemitism appearing on the pages of the Crimean press reflected these facts. If Western Ukrainian or Baltic authors had “their own” charges
against the Jews (economic oppression of the Ukrainian population, let us say, or religio-cultural alienation), Crimean journalists had to borrow the doctrine the occupiers brought with them, and this was nothing other than the idea of the political domination of the Jews in the USSR, the thesis of “Yid-Bolshevism.” It was precisely this version of antisemitic discourse that predominated in the Crimean organs of mass information.

The Effectiveness of Antisemitic Propaganda

There are two sides to the question of the effectiveness of antisemitic propaganda in the Crimea: 1) Did the occupied people absorb the information and ideas thrust upon them via printed publications, posters, loudspeakers, movies, and school classrooms? What picture of the Jews did they take away with them? 2) Did people take Nazi precepts as a guide for action, i.e., did their propaganda constitute a factor that in the right situation would inspire someone to pull the trigger or file a denunciation with the police? Expressed otherwise, what part of the audience was (or allowed itself to be) persuaded that the prewar worldview had been forced upon it by the Jews, and what portion of this part took concrete steps to avenge itself upon those now identified as their political, cultural, and racial foes?

For an assessment of the results of Nazi propaganda activity, we must begin with a look at the moral-psychological state of the population of the Crimea on the eve of the occupation. What was the soil on which the seeds fell? The Simferopol underground fighter I. Nosenko noted in his diary a month after the fall of the city that in its attitudes the population fell into three groups:

[1] The supporters of fascism, and there were not many of those . . . [2] People who think it is better to stick around and wait, to be on guard—maybe we can get along somehow under fascism. . . . Such people were the huge, overwhelming majority. Among them was the politically ignorant part of the workers, and ordinary citizens, and the intelligentsia that stood aside from politics, and yesterday’s communists . . . and the aged, eternally rasping about the former paradise. . . . This group is very fickle in its moods. Now it shrieks about the cruelty of the Germans, now it inveighs against “Jewish domination,” now it flames with internationalism. . . . [3] People who remained true to their colors, for whom the honor and dignity of man are not empty sounds, who love their nation, their culture, their country—people like that are few and far between.86

This and similar testimonies describe a population partially or completely demoralized. Under such circumstances, propaganda generally, and its antisemitic theses particularly, could fill the intellectual-political vacuum left by the departure of the Soviet power.

Linked with this is the question of popular acceptance of the occupation press. It is difficult to agree with one researcher’s assessment that “decent people did not read these newspapers.”86a It is no wonder that during a nearly complete lack of information the population avidly seized upon any news of the situation at the fronts.
and of the rules issued by the “new masters”: in the first place, practically no other publications or alternative sources of information existed; and in the second place, life often hung on the official news, for it contained orders disobedience to which might be punishable by death. All of this led to what the office of the garrison commandant of Feodosiia took as enthusiasm in a report of December 16, 1941: “The first edition of the paper printed in Feodososiya was sold on the street. The local population received the paper with lively interest, and the edition sold out remarkably quickly.”

Reports by the city commandant of Evpatoriia repeatedly noted that the population was reading the newspapers Evpatoriiskie izvestiia and GK with the greatest interest. Orders for more copies of GK came from field commandants of rural districts of the Crimea: Voinka in February 1942, Armiansk in May 1942, and Seytler, Ichki, and Islam-Terek in May 1942. The great popularity of GK was mentioned in the April 1942 report of Section Ic of the Eleventh Army command.

In an effort to answer our question we also need to take some socio-psychological rules into account. One of these is the governmentally encouraged habit of trusting the printed word, a proclivity that could affect people’s reactions to Nazi publications. Further, having gone through the school of Stalinist totalitarianism with its steady diet of propaganda against internal enemies, a large part of the population may have been psychologically prepared to accept other images of “the enemy.”

On the other hand, the occupation regime in the Crimea—owing to its location in the zone of military operations—distinguished itself by its cruelty and was quickly discredited. People knew about conditions in the German camps for prisoners of war and civilians, and about the actual conditions of those forcibly transported to Germany (whose life was repeatedly painted in bright colors by GK). As a result, the authority of the German word could hardly have remained at a high level throughout the occupation.

One testimonial to the effectiveness of propaganda in the Crimea belonged to Einsatzgruppe D and was cited in “Report from the Occupied Eastern Territories” (July 31, 1942): “German propaganda is accepted as truthful. In the category of print propaganda, the three brochures by von Albrecht enjoyed great success. . . . Propaganda in the form of posters, especially the posters “The Jew in the Star of David” and “Stalin Will Be Driven Out” are having a good effect. . . . In general the newspapers circulating in the Crimea are exerting a positive influence.” Interestingly, an August 27, 1942, report prepared by the Press and Education Department of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories repeated the same information practically verbatim.

One of the evaluations, by no means comforting, appears in the transcript of a conversation with E. E. Gopshtein:

I was familiar with the antisemitic literature of the pre-revolutionary period, but this does not compare in any way with what Golos Kryma served up. . . . Hitlerism encroached not only on economic life but also on the psyche of the population. This
poison did not pass through without a trace. This antisemitism poisoned the population—not that everyone accepted all the lies, but they absorbed what they saw in print.95

One fact supports Gopshtein’s opinion. The Communist Party Central Committee sent a group of professionals from its Department of Propaganda and Agitation to the liberated territories in 1944 “to afford practical assistance in the task of reestablishing propaganda work in the localities.” They visited thirty-seven regions and republics, and they gave more than 600 reports and lectures. The local population asked questions that were recorded and later included in reports to A. A. Zhdanov, Central Committee Secretary and Stalin’s de facto cultural affairs adviser. One of the many questions that were asked at the meetings with speakers was the following: “Is it true that we are dominated by the Jews?”96 Such a question, posed in such an innocent manner, would have been impossible before the occupation.

On May 12, 1944, five members of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation group arrived in the Crimea, where they worked for one and a half months with officials of all Communist Party city and district committees. “Some local party workers incorrectly believe that the occupation did not leave any imprint on the consciousness and psychology of the people,” warned a report they sent to Zhdanov on July 19, 1944. Meanwhile the authors of the report painted quite a favorable picture of their meetings with Crimean intellectuals. They quoted the words of a certain Professor Buzynskii, not a party member:

Fascist propaganda aroused our disgust not only because it was a pack of lies, but also because again and again the Germans displayed their political limitations, their stupidity, and their scientific bankruptcy. At first we thought that they took us for fools. Then we saw that any ordinary Soviet citizen ranks higher in his political understanding and vision than German military officers. It was amusing and absurd to us when a German officer who considered himself a civilized man showed us in all seriousness a certificate proclaiming his racial purity. The massacre of the Jewish population was alien and incomprehensible to us. Many Russian doctors and Russian teachers who had Jewish relatives voluntarily went before the firing squads with them because they wanted in this way to register a protest against German barbarism.97

This commentary, however, describes the attitude of only a minority of the mass audience, a sector that by virtue of its education could better withstand Nazi propaganda. One suspects that the less educated and “ideologically grounded” readers—the majority—did not react so critically. The reaction of a peasant was noted by I. I. Sirota, a Jew who concealed his identity while living in the village:

A poster was hanging in the village center showing an image of a Jew wearing horns like the devil behind bars, and the whole poster had inscriptions all over it with the message that the Jews were mocking the people; they were to blame for everything. There was a fellow named Putilenko in the village. When they put up this picture, he was standing next to me. When he read the inscriptions, he believed them. Shaking all over, he yelled out, “Look at the ugly mug of that Yid!! I’d _____ him!”98
The responses cited above suggest that some part of the population living under the occupation in fact accepted on faith the precepts of the Nazis, including antisemitism.\(^9\)

In the practical scheme of things this could mean the prevalence in the population either of Jew-hatred or, more commonly, indifference toward the destruction of the Jewish minority. However, this conclusion must remain preliminary. Any final verdict will have to await the discovery of more definitive documentation, not only of individual response, but that of different groups: urban residents and peasants, intellectuals and the less educated, groups representing various age categories and nationalities, and residents of various localities.\(^1\)

There is another side to the question of the effectiveness of Nazi antisemitic propaganda. The peninsula was liberated in April and May 1944. Returning to their home areas, experiencing hunger and deprivation, people made their transitions to peacetime life. Postwar relationships, however, were complicated by occasional property and housing disputes between the people returning from evacuation and those who had remained. Jews also returned from evacuation and from the army. Those who had lived under the Nazis had endured a systematic assault on their psyches, and the myths imposed by the Germans had left their trace.\(^2\) What remained of the Nazi psychological intervention in the consciousness of the various sectors of the Crimean population? How deep had its influence been? What role did it play in post-war inter-ethnic relations? In everyday life? We must not forget that Soviet state antisemitism was on the upswing, thus further complicating our questions. Such matters should be the topics of further investigations.

**Notes**

1. The author expresses gratitude to the Jewish (Welfare) Center “Khesed Shimon” (Simferopol); the Sefer Moscow Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization; and to the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for a Charles H. Revson Fellowship for Archival Research for 2002/03.


11. O. A. Pashinova, “‘Evreiskii vopros’ na stranitsakh okkupatsionnoi gazety ‘Dzvin’ g. Krivogo Roga” presented at Nauchno-issledovatel’skaiia rabota otkrytogo studencheskogo konkursa “Istorii i uroki Khokolosta” (Kiev, 2003). Author’s manuscript.


18. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhirv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 125, d. 172, l. 16, 52.


22. Herzstein, Anti-Jewish Propaganda, p. 35.

23. Erich von Manstein’s Eleventh Army was deployed on the peninsula until August 1942, when it was redeployed to Leningrad; the Crimea passed into the operational sphere of Army Group A, under the command (from November 1942) of Field Marshal Evald von Kleist. In October 1943 the Crimea was occupied by the Seventeenth Army, which had been transferred to Army Group A under Colonel General Erwin Jänecke.

24. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 242, T501 (Records of German Field Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories and others), reel 59, frame 435.

25. Information for April 1942 from a report of Propaganda Department Ukraine. NARA, T77 (Records of Headquarters, German Army High Command, OKW), reel 1034, frames 6506506–6506511.


28. Yad Vashem Archives, Record Group M 29 FR (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg), file 84, pp. 2–9.

29. Units of Einsatzgruppe D were stationed in the Crimea from November 1941 until August 1942: the staff in Simferopol; Sonderkommando (Special Detachment) 10b in Feodosiya, Kerch, Sudak, and Dzhankoi; Einsatzkommando (Operations Detachment) 11a in Kokkozy, Yalta, Bakhchisarai, and Simeiz; and Einsatzkommando 11b in Simferopol, Evpatoriiia, Alushta, Karasubazar, and Zuia.

30. NARA, RG 242, T175 (Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police), reel 273, frame 2769581.

31. NARA, RG 242, T175, reel 273, frame 2769583. For the service records of one of them, Dr. Wilhelm Schroer, who served as propaganda officer in Einsatzgruppe D, see also French L. McLean, The Field Men: The SS Men Who Led the Einsatzkommandos, the Nazi Mobile Killing Units (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999), p. 110.


33. A file of GK and other serials is currently held in the State Archives of the Crimean Autonomous Republic (GAARK).

34. According to the 1939 census, Russians made up 49.6 percent of the population of the peninsula, Ukrainians 13.7 percent. Krym mnogonatsional’nyi (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1988), p. 72.
35. GAARK, f. R-2638, op.2, d.11-a, l.5.

36. Interestingly, a few days later the January 8, 1942, issue of GK printed a translation from Der Kampf (The Struggle, published in Simferopol) about the Karaites. The article maintained that “many students of race associate the Karaites with the northwestern group of Turkish peoples to which the Crimean Tatars of the steppes also belong,” and that the Karaites “had been in open enmity with the Jewish people for centuries.” The Karaites escaped the Holocaust. Repeated Nazi “expert inquiries” in the Crimea and elsewhere confirmed that the Karaites were not “racially” Jews. See Phillip Friedman, “The Karaites under Nazi Rule” in Max Beloff, ed., On the Track of Tyranny: Essays Presented by the Weiner Library to Leonard G. Montefiore, O.B.E. on the occasion of his seventieth birthday (London; Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971 <1960>), pp. 97–123; Warren Green, “The Fate of the Crimean Jewish Community: Askenezim, Krimchaks, and Karaites,” Jewish Social Studies 46:2 (1984), pp. 169–76. Clearly the authorities felt a need to explain why an ethnic group espousing a variant of Judaism was not being eliminated. Another translation appeared in GK on July 25, 1943.

37. GAARK, f. P-156, op. 1, d. 31 (Dnevnik KH. G. Lashkevicha), 142.

38. When the subject was Jews in Western countries, financial-political domination was ascribed to them, and expressions such as “Jewish international financial plutocracy” were key.

39. Otkroveniia i priznaniia. Natsistskaia verkhushka o voine

40. Nor did the Nazis ignore another quite numerous target audience: the Crimean Tatars, Moslems whom Nazi propagandists counted on attracting as a tactical ploy. A detailed analysis of propaganda (including antisemitic) for the Crimean Tatars can help one to understand the occupation.


42. Soviet propaganda wanted readers to believe the Nazis reserved their most intense hatred for the Slavs. The occupiers sought to “enlighten” the population about the “true” nature of National Socialist racism: “National Socialism is struggling against internationalism, which finds its followers and leaders in the first instance among the Jewish people. As far as any other nationality is concerned, National Socialism not only recognizes it, it supports it” (GK, January 4, 1942).

43. According to one investigator, some eighty places of worship were open, including (as of April 1943) forty-five Russian Orthodox churches. Iu. A. Katunin, Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v gody Vtoroi Mirovoi voiny (1939–1945 gg.) (Simferopol: Piramida Krym, 2000), p. 84.

44. Naturally, this was not a new subject. J. Trachtenberg, a student of Western European antisemitism during the Middle Ages, considered the tale of Evstratii the Faster the earliest link in the chain of European accusations that Jews engaged in ritual murder; according to the thirteenth-century story, Evstratii had been crucified in 1096 by Jews as part of their Passover rites (D’iavol i evrei [Moscow; Jerusalem: Gesharim, 1998], p. 122). The near-straightforward borrowing of stories from the Middle Ages bespeaks the methods of Nazi propagandists and their local henchmen.

45. One must not exclude the possibility that Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler himself was behind exploitation of the “blood libel” in the occupied territories. In May 1943 he stated in a
letter to security chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner that he had ordered a large number of copies of the book *Jewish Ritual Murders* and had ordered their distribution to the Einsatzkommandos. “I imagine that with antisemitic propaganda on a broad scale in English and perhaps in Russian, using ritual murders in our propaganda, we could greatly energize antisemitism around the world.” See *SS v deistvi: Dokumenty o prestupeniakh SS* (Moscow: Svetoton, 2000), pp. 161–62.

46. Using the example of analogous items in the Belorussian periodical press under the occupation, S. Zhumar analyzed the extent to which the news corresponded with actual events of the Holocaust. In his opinion, news about anti-Jewish legislation sometimes contained omissions but for the most part did not distort its meaning. The number of Jews “confined to” ghettos or camps was almost always close to the number exterminated in particular regions. “Pressa ob antievreiskikh aktiakh v Tsentral’noi, Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Evrope (na materialakh beloruskoiaazychnoi okkupatsionnoi periodiki, 1941–1944 godov)” in *Materialy 8-i nezhelannarodnoi konferentsii po iudaikhe* (Moscow: Sefer, 2000), pp. 212–16. Since information came from a single German source, it can be assumed that the same applies to GK.

47. Some newspapers in other regions more straightforwardly illuminated “practical measures” taken in the struggle against “Yid-Bolshevism.” While refraining from words about killing, they nevertheless informed readers about many things: the creation of ghettos (*L’vovskie vesti* and *Rodnaia zemlia* in Lvov; *Novoe ukrainskoe slovo* in Kiev); the numbers of Jews in the city (*Nashe slovo* in Brest, *Novyi put’* in Kaluga, and others); and official calls to inform the authorities about Jews in hiding. Al’tman, *Zhertvy nenavisti*, pp. 49–51.


49. Information that might have provided the basis for articles specifically about the Crimean Jews was plentiful, but was not used in the press. Occupation agencies were active in collecting information about the history of the peninsula. Despite the fact that the “Jewish Question” had been solved already, the Jews and their role in the development of the economy and culture of the region received considerable attention internally. Einsatzgruppe D distributed to the army in April 1942 a ten-page review titled “The Development and Influence of Jewry in the Crimea” examining each Crimean city and each sphere of Crimean life. The percentage of Jews in the Communist Party apparatus, security organs, economic structures, and cultural institutions was a focus. The review was accompanied by diagrams stressing the presence of Jews in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of the population (*Yad Vashem Archives, RG M29FR/117/100–109*). The Crimean branch of Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (responsible for cultural plunder throughout Europe) commissioned a study by a Simferopol intelligenter under the title “Jews in the Crimea.” Containing a huge amount of factual material, the final product (completed no later than June 1943) also could have been used over and over again for propaganda purposes. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum archives (USHMMMA), Record group RG-31.002M (Reichskommissariat fur die Ukraine and Einsatzstab Rosenberg records from the Ukraine Central State Archive), reel 9 (“Raboty krynshikh professorov, sotrudnichestvikh s natsistami”). And yet none of these materials found their way into GK. Why? Probably not because of weak cooperation among German agencies, but because use of similar materials was not the accepted methodology. Ian Kershaw makes “depersonalization” a central thrust of antisemitic propaganda in Germany, turning the Jews into an abstract, ideological anti-symbol. (“How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?” in David Welch, ed., *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations* [London: Croom Helm; Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1982], pp. 502–3).
1983], p. 181.) It seems those making the decisions sensed that the specifics might have appeared improbable, or challengeable, in an official publication, whereas the abstract image of the Jew as arch anti-symbol would be less vulnerable to specific criticism or doubt.


52. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 178.

53. For the correspondence among departments of the Ministry of Propaganda concerning the publication of this bulletin see NARA, RG-242, T580, reel 675, frames 533–62.

54. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 178m, 152.

55. Aleksandr Ivanovich Buldeev was a man of letters who as early as 1919 had participated in the cultural activities of the White Movement in Siberia (he was a member of the “Renaissance League” and the “Slavonic Union” in Omsk, and he edited the newspaper of the White government headed by Admiral Kolchak (http://www.omsk.edu.ru/project/64/dat48.htm [Web site “White Omsk”]). He subsequently made his way to the Crimea, where in 1922 he published the story “From Verkharn: Poor People” in Pomoshchi: Khudozhestvenno-literaturnye i nauchnopopolarnye sborniki, no. 1 (Simferopol: Krym TsK Pomgola, 1922) (http://www.ruthenia.ru/solvit/ciss0000.html). In 1931 he was imprisoned for six months (Gurkovich, “Pevtsy svoobody” doktora Gebbel’sa, p. 53). Subsequently he worked for a time in a legal consultation office in Sudak (in the Crimea). In 1943 he was sent to Germany; from there he passed through the American Zone of Occupation and eventually made his way to the United States. In 1949 he published a poem, Radost’ moia. Prepodobnyi Serafim Sarovskii (Jordanville, NY: Tipografiia preodobnogo Iova Pochaevskogo v Sviato-Troitskom monastyre, 1949) (http://www.ruthenia.ru/solvit/p_tit018.html).


57. Ibid.


59. One might judge the extent of consumer demand for Soviet printed items by a curious fact appearing in the October 1942 “Report on Partisan Operations in the Crimea” to the chief of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement by Colonel Lobov, then commander of the Crimean partisans: Pravda was selling at that time for 100 rubles, i.e., one hundred times more than the (easily available) GK (RGASPI, f. 69, op. 1, d. 618, 48). Aspid was the pen name of A. E. Kapralov. From August 1942 until the German retreat he had worked for Russkaia Pravda (later Utro Kavkaza) in the North Caucasus. He ended the war in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany and emigrated to America, where he managed a department of Voice of America. B. N. Kovalev, Natsistskaia okkupatsiia i kollaboratsionizm v Rossii, 1941–1944 (Moscow: Ast, 2004), pp. 346–47.

60. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 233, frame 390.
61. USHMMA, RG-06.025*05, witness statement by N. F. Sulima on October 17, 1947, p. 7.
62. Ibid., p. 9.
63. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 233, frame 726.
64. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 57, frame 407.
65. USHMMA, RG-06.025*05, p. 8.
66. GAARK, f. P-1, op. 1, d. 2277, 59.

67. According to the 1939 census, Crimean Tatars were the second largest (19.4 percent) ethnic group in the Crimea (Krym mnogonatsional’nyi, p. 72)


69. KOMZET (Komitet po zemel’nomu ustroistvu trudiaschikhkhiia evreev, Committee for the Agricultural Organization of Toiling Jews) was a state organization with the mission of establishing Jews as farmers. It was established in 1924 and liquidated in 1938. OZET (Vsesoiuznoe obschestvo po zemel’nomu ustroistvu trudiaschikhkhiia evreev v SSSR, All-Union Society for the Agricultural Organization of Toiling Jews in the USSR) was the official mass organization charged with supporting KOMZET, in part by collecting funds inside the USSR and abroad, and by providing technical, medical, and cultural assistance to the settlers.

70. For additional details on the ethnic contradictions see Allan L. Kagedan, Soviet Zion: The Quest for a Russian Jewish Homeland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 80–87; and G. V. Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Stalina: Vlast’ i antisemitizm (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2001), pp. 95, 96, 111.

71. One of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar national movement, Amet Ozenbashly, wrote an article titled “K osnovam postroeniia nashego obrazovaniia i vospitaniia v usloviiakh voennogo vremeni” in the newspaper Azat Kirim in September 1943, where he stated that the reason for shooting V. Ibragimov and others in 1928 was the victims’ “protest against the settling of Jews in the best land of the Crimea” (Golos Kryma [today’s], September 5, 2003, p. 7). The actual reason for his doom was Moscow’s offensive against all nationally oriented political elites. Land disputes in the Crimea were only a specific expression of what the regime sought.


73. O. V. Roman’ko names the following reasons for the reorganization of the propaganda apparatus in the Crimea in the fall of 1942: 1) the final clearing of the Crimea of Soviet troops, after which the German commanders needed to work with the civilian population; and 2) the need to inculcate popular loyalty before employing the Crimea as a platform for the invasion of the Caucasus (“Nemetskaia propaganda v Krymiu,” p. 41). In my view, there were a number of reasons for the creation of a separate fixed local staff: 1) the departure of the Eleventh Army; 2) the departure of the staff of Einsatzgruppe D; 3) the transfer of certain areas to civilian
control after September 1, 1942 (General Commissariat Taurien, with Alfred Frauenfeld as
Commissar). It was essential to establish an apparatus immune from military redeployments.

74. GAARK, f. P-156, op. 1, d. 26: Kopii prikazov, tsirkuliarov i direktiv nemetskogo shtaba
propagandy v Krymu ob ideologicheskoi obrabotke naseleniia.

75. For more details concerning the structure of the staff, see Roman’ko, “Nemetskaia propa-
ganda v Krymu,” pp. 41–44.

76. GAARK, f. P-156, op. 1, d. 27: Sbornik materialov germanskogo ot dela propagandy dlia
radioperedach na okkupirovannoi territorii (Radiovestnik, nos. 1, 5, 7–9, 12).

77. Ibid., Radiovestnik 5, p. 37.

78. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), F. 7021, op. 9, d. 45, 60ob.

79. Al’tman, Zhertvy nenavisti, p. 45.

80. Compare David Bankier, “The Use of Antisemitism in Nazi Wartime Propaganda” in
Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck, eds., The Holocaust and History: The Known, the
Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in associ-
ation with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2002), p. 52.

81. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 57.


83. Abramson, “This Is the Way It Was!,” pp. 547, 549.

84. On German plans for the Crimea see Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 253–57.

Relations during the Second World War,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 21:1–2 (Summer–

86. GAARK, f. P-156, op. 1, d. 31, 166ob, 167.

86a. Smilianskaia, p. 304.

87. Al’tman, Zhertvy nenavisti, p. 42.

88. See for example the report of the Evpatoriia Ortskommandatur of 13.04.42 (NARA, 242 ,
T501, reel 64, frame 587).

89. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 57, frame 369.

90. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 64, frame 738.

91. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 233, frame 622.

92. NARA, RG-242, T501, reel 59, frame 294.

93. USHMMA, RG-11.001 M.01 (RSHA—SD, Berlin), reel 11 (Osoby Archives, fond 500, opis 1, delo 775, list 378).

94. YIVO Institute Archives, RG-215 (Berlin collection), OCCE-17, p. 8.


96. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 242, 99, 100.
97. Ibid., 93.


100. At the same time, even within the listed social, professional, and other groups, attitudes toward the Jews varied depending on many factors, e.g., personal morality, material circumstances, etc.

101. In August 1944 a senior official of the People’s Commissariat of State Security of Ukraine gave as one of the reasons for the spread of antisemitism the influence of Nazi propaganda. Alshuler, “Antisemitism in Ukraine,” p. 84.

**Appendix 1**

Periodicals Published in Occupied Crimea (State Archives of the Crimean Autonomous Republic [GAARK, subject files]); and V. K. Garagulia et al., eds., Krym v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyni, 1941–45: Voprosy-otvety Vypusk 4 (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1994), p. 82.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Dates</th>
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<th>Language</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deutsche Krim Zeitung</td>
<td>Propaganda-Staff Crimea of the Prop. [sic]</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>4 pp.; size changes</td>
<td>October 1942–?</td>
<td>daily except Monday</td>
<td>German</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blick in die Welt (World at a Glance)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>8 pp.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>weekly</td>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Golos Kryma (Voice of the Crimea)</td>
<td>Simferopol city admin.</td>
<td>from 3,000 to 80,000</td>
<td>4 pp.</td>
<td>December 12, 1941–April 9, 1944</td>
<td>3/week</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feodosiiskii vestnik (Feodosia Herald)</td>
<td>Feodosiia city admin. Ed. I.S. Kharchenko</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 pp.; size changes</td>
<td>July 1941–?</td>
<td>2/wk.</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evpatoriiskie izvestiia (Evpatoria News); from August 1943 Osvobozhdenie (Liberation)</td>
<td>Evpatoria city admin. Ed. N. F. Sulima</td>
<td>from 1500 to 800</td>
<td>2–4 pp.</td>
<td>December 31 1941–?</td>
<td>2/week</td>
<td>Russian</td>
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*continued*
## Appendix 1  continued

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<th>Dates</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sakskie izvestiia</strong> (Saki News)</td>
<td>Saki district admin. Ed. G. M. Panchenko</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 pp.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2/week</td>
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<td><strong>Zemledelets Tavridy</strong> (Tauride Farmer)</td>
<td>Simferopol city admin.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>4 pp.; length changes</td>
<td>March 1943–?</td>
<td>weekly</td>
<td>Russian</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Azat Kinim</strong> (Liberated Crimea)</td>
<td>Simferopol city admin., then Crimean Moslem Committee. Ed. M. Kurtiev</td>
<td>up to 15,000</td>
<td>4 pp.; length changes</td>
<td>January 11, 1942–April 9, 1944</td>
<td>2/week</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar (Cyrillic, Latin, Arabic script)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mir zhenschiny</strong> (Woman’s World), supplement to Golos Kryma</td>
<td>Simferopol city admin.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 pp.</td>
<td>May 21, 1943–?</td>
<td>monthly</td>
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<td><strong>Molodost’</strong> (Youth), supplement to Golos Kryma</td>
<td>Simferopol city admin.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 pp.</td>
<td>July 18, 1943–?</td>
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<td><strong>Biuleten’ Yaltinskogo gorupravleniia</strong> (Bulletin of the Yalta City Administration); from March 5, 1944 Iuzhnyi Krym (Southern Crimea)</td>
<td>Yalta city admin.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2–4 pp.</td>
<td>December 1943–March 1944</td>
<td>weekly</td>
<td>Russian</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Osvobozhdennyi Krym</strong> (Liberated Crimea)</td>
<td>Staryi Krym city admin.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>4 pp.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Russian</td>
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<td><strong>Poslednie novosti</strong> (Latest News) (newspaper for city and village)</td>
<td>Feodosiia city admin.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>4 pp.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vestnik Kerchi</strong> (Kerch Herald)</td>
<td>Kerch city admin. Ed. N. Nelidov</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stroitel’</strong> (The Builder)</td>
<td>City unknown. Mng. ed. S. Zelenin, Ed. Vladimirov.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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Appendix 2

Pseudonyms and Real Names of Authors in *Golos Kryma*, compiled by staff of Crimean Oblast Archives in 1946 (GAARK, f. R-2638, op.2, d.1-g, l.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Actual Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Arzamaev</td>
<td>Tarkhov, V. F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Aleksandrova</td>
<td>Buldeev, A. I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panin</td>
<td>Panin, I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verner</td>
<td>Shagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. T.</td>
<td>Tarkhov, V. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Vladimirova</td>
<td>Gavrilova, A. V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Gorniko</td>
<td>Gorodnichenko, A. I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Dmitriev</td>
<td>Bykovich, K. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Il’in</td>
<td>Buldeev, A. I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Krasov</td>
<td>Naumov, S. P.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Milov</td>
<td>Mikhailov, A. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Krymov</td>
<td>Bykovich, K. A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Ch.</td>
<td>Chigir’, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-kh</td>
<td>Maurakh, Bruno</td>
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<tr>
<td>O. Marshev</td>
<td>Shramchenko</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Neznamov</td>
<td>Naumov, S. P.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Pravdina</td>
<td>Yushkevich, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. la.</td>
<td>Shul’ga, V. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. G.</td>
<td>Gavrilov, S. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Sergeev</td>
<td>Gavrilov, S. F.</td>
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<td>Eronim Sudakov</td>
<td>Shul’ga, V. A.</td>
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<td>V. Fedorov</td>
<td>Gavrilov, S. F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Yuriev</td>
<td>Donskoi, N. Yu.</td>
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<td>V. Iuzhin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pavl’ Iartsev</td>
<td>Shul’ga, V. A.</td>
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Appendix 3

Signatures under Antisemitic Items in *Golos Kryma*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author (pseudonym)</th>
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<td>A. Zaitsev</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al’fa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspid</td>
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<tr>
<td>V. Kovylev</td>
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<td>V. Fedorov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhuk</td>
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<td>Z. F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Gorskii</td>
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<tr>
<td>Igor Stepanov</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Severin</td>
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<td>P. Stepanov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stepnev (N. C.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Rusov</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Leonidov</td>
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*continued*
**Appendix 3  continued**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author (pseudonym)</th>
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<tr>
<td>I. Aleksandrov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stefan Zelenin</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. Yarovskii</td>
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<td>Setenev</td>
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<td>B. Shiriaev</td>
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<td>Krymov</td>
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<td>M. Boikov</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Bykovich</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dm. Petrov</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vas. Sokolov</td>
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