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РЕЦЕНЗИИ НА МОНОГРАФИИ

АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ РЕЦЕНЗИИ НА СТАТЬИ ЖУРНАЛА

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РЕВИТАЛИЗАЦИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ИСЛАМА И ЕГО ВЛИЯНИЕ НА ДЕМОКРАТИЮ В ТУРЦИИ (В ПЕРИОД 1980–2000 гг.)

В статье рассматриваются внутриполитические процессы в Турции в период 1980–2000-х гг., в частности, описывается концепция турецко-исламского синтеза, а также возрождение политического ислама и их влияние на развитие демократии в Турции. Феномен турецко-исламского синтеза стоит рассматривать в качестве проявления культурной бифуркации турецкого общества. Он был обусловлен, прежде всего, социальными и экономическими изменениями, массовой миграцией сельского населения в города, интенсивной урбанизацией, развитием промышленности, которые в свою очередь повлияли на дальнейшую фрагментацию и усиление дифференциации внутри турецкого общества. Также в статье приводится подробное описание Партии благоденствия (Refah Partisi), основанной Неджметтином Эрбаканом, дальнейший раскол которой способствовал переосмыслению концепции политического ислама и разделению его последователей на традиционалистов и реформистов. Роль ислама во внутриполитической жизни Турции, заметно возросшая в последние двадцать лет прошлого столетия, рассматривается в статье в качестве основного фактора, сформировавшего ряд предпосылок для появления и развития сегодняшней правящей Партии справедливости и развития.

Ключевые слова: *Турция, политический ислам, демократия, турецко-исламский синтез, Партия благоденствия Турции, Партия справедливости и развития Турции.*

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TURKEY IN THE LAST TWO DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY: ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN POLITICS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

This paper focuses on Turkish politics of the 1980–2000's period and, in particular, discusses the concept of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the process of revitalization of political Islam and its implications for democracy in Turkey. Phenomenon of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis should be perceived as one of the manifestations of cultural bifurcation of Turkish society, caused by socioeconomic change, with mass migration from rural areas and intensive urbanization, industrialization and development of a service industry, which deepened social differentiation and fragmentation in Turkey. The growing role of Islam in Turkish politics in the last two decades of the 20th century is discussed in this paper in terms of the prerequisites that paved the way for the formation of today's ruling Justice and Development Party. In particular, the paper describes the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) of Necmettin Erbakan, the dissolution of which eventually led to the rethinking within the Islamic movement about its future political strategy and further split to the «traditionalists» and «reformists».

Key words: *Turkey, political Islam, democracy, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the Welfare Party of Turkey, the Justice and Development Party of Turkey.*

After the unstable period from the 1960s to the 1980s, marked by strong political polarization within society, the Turkish electorate was seeking a centrist solution to the maladies of the party system in order to ensure regime stability[1]. This fact partly explains the success of the center-right Motherland Party (MP) under Turgut Özal in the general election of November 6, 1983. The party had come to the power with the slogan "freer market, smaller state". Thus, the major policy objective of the Özal era was the liberalization of the economy, including privatization, abolishment of import restrictions, reduction in government expenditure, promotion of export-oriented and/or supply-side economics etc.,

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[1] Mert N. 2000. Türkiye'de Merkez Sağ Siyaset: Merkez Sağ Politikaların Oluşumu, in Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik, ed. by S. Yerasımos Stefanos, Günter Seufart, K. Vorhoff, Ankara: İletişim Yayıncılık. – P. 56.

accompanied by efforts to renew the bureaucracy by disregarding already existing institutions in favor of newly formed ones[1].

According to Özal, political liberalization could only be achieved via economic liberalization. Economic policies were legitimized by claiming that they would promote the future interests of society. Ideologically, economic liberalism and political liberalism were separated from each other[2].

Despite the high rates of economic growth between 1983 and 1987, Özal's economic modernization program had run into serious problems in the second half of the decade, including runaway inflation that increased from 30% in 1983 to 80% in 1988[3]. Furthermore, economic policies had worsened the gap between the rich and the poor, as the latter experienced a drastic decline in their standard of living and real income. Electoral competition with the comeback of the pre-1980s politicians also gave way to a more confrontational approach that resulted in a steady decline of electoral support for the MP government.

By early 1987, Turkey was witnessing the rise of inter-party competition and fragmentation within the party system because of the emergence of the old parties and leaders of the right as a result of the referendum, which favoured the pre-1980s parties. It should be noted that Özal actively campaigned against lifting the ban on the parties. He argued that the return to politics of the prominent party leaders of the 1970s would destabilize the fragile political system and jeopardize the chances of consolidating democracy in Turkey[4].

To maintain its position, the MP pursued economic policy measures such as higher agricultural support prices and heavy spending in constituencies that merely exacerbated the economic deficiencies and problems. The MP's performance in the general election of October 29, 1987 clearly indicated that it was on a downward trend, receiving just 36% of the votes compared with 45% in 1983. The party's era came to an end with the defeat in the polls in October 1991[5]. New elections heralded in a coalition between the Demirel-led True Path Party (TPP) (Doğru Yol Partisi) and the Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP) (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti). The results of that election, with five parties now in parliament, signaled the return of the problematic trend towards fragmentation in national politics.

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[1] Yeldan E. 2002. Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi: Bölüşüm, Birikim ve Büyüme, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. – P. 25.

[2] Toker N. 2005. Türkiye'de Liberalizm ve Birey, in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 7, İstanbul: İleişim Yayınları. – P. 116–117.

[3] Ergüder Ü. 1988. Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey, in Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey ed. E. Ozbudun, Ankara, Türk Siyasi Bilimler Derneği Yayını. – P. 160.

[4] Cemal H. 1989. Özal Hikayesi, Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi. – P. 211–221.

[5] Sakallıoğlu-Cizre Ü. 1996. 1983–1984: Siyasal Parti Topografyası, in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 15, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. – P. 1251.

To summarize the impact of the Özal Government on democratization processes in Turkey's post-coup era, it should be noted that there were two main outcomes of that period: the re-emergence of identities in Turkey and the revitalization of political Islam. While the former could be regarded as a generally positive trend, the latter had an ambiguous impact on Turkey's democracy. Indeed, the MP successfully established itself as a political force "for the softening of political conflict" and in creating "policy-oriented dialogue" in post-1980 political life[1]. Previously known as "taboo subjects", various problems (mainly the Kurdish question) began to be discussed. Alongside the Kurdish problem, many new actors such as environmentalists, religious people and repressed women emerged in the Turkish public sphere. This was something new for Turkish politics – new constituencies emerging with the demand that they be accepted as equal to others. Thus, micro-scale identity struggles took the place of the macro-scale class struggles of the pre-1980s.

However, Özal's attempt to synthesize market modernism with Muslim identity under the label of "conservative nationalism"[2] paved the way to a rethink of the role of Islam in Turkish politics and society. As Heper has said, through reconciling the former cultural orientations with the requisites of economic growth and Western democracy, Islam became embedded in policies which emphasized market forces, the privatization of state enterprices and the decentralization of government[3].

As a reuslt of the economic reforms, a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged in the provincial towns of Anatolia, including Denizli, Gaziantep, Kayseri and Kahramanmaraş. The new middle class – the so-called Anatolian bourgeoise – had strong roots in Islamic culture. Under Özal's more permissive approach to religion, Muslim groups and brotherhoods were given greater freedoms and were allowed to finance the construction of private schools and, subsequently, universities.

Thus, in the post-1980 era, largely because of Özal's politics, Islam was reincorporated subtly into Turkish nationalism and the concept of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis re-emerged[4]. The implementation of this concept can be viewed as an attempt to create a more homogeneous community and to insulate the population from the influence of left-wing ideologies. The synthesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On the one hand, under the 1982 Constitution, Turkey was

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[1] Göle N. 2000. 80 Sonrası Politik Kültür, in Türkiye'de Politik Kültür ve Modernleşme ed. E. Kalaycıoğlu and A.Y. Sarıbay İstanbul: AlfaYayınları. – P. 425.

[2] Özal T. 1987. Anavatan Partisi Nedir, Ne Değildir? Anavatan Partisi Ne Yaptı, Ne Yapıyor, Ne Yapacak? Anavatan Partisi Basın-Yayın Dağıtım ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı, Ankara. – P. 137.

[3] Heper M. 1991. The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, V:18. – P. 38–51.

[4] Çaha Ö. 2004. Ana Temalarıyla 1980 Sonrası İslami Uyanış, in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. – P. 477.

defined as a secular state. On the other, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as a means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken the emphasis on secularism[1].

As mentioned above, largely due to Özal's initiatives, political Islam witnessed a strong resurgence in the early 1990s. In the March 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party received 19% of the vote and won the mayor's office in 28 municipalities, including Turkey's two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara.

The Welfare Party (WP) (Refah Partisi) was formed in 1983. It is perceived as a successor of the National Salvation Party (NSP) (Milli Selamet Partisi), which was founded in October 1972 by Necmettin Erbakan and closed down after the 1980 coup. The NSP agitated for a return to Islam's teachings and the "Muslim way of life". In place of ties to the West, the party favored the creation of a Muslim Common Market with the Islamic dinar as its common currency, and the development of a Muslim Defense Alliance[2]. After the party was shut down, its leader Erbakan and some other party members were banned from political activities for 10 years. Yet the party re-emerged in 1983 under a new name, the Welfare Party, with an ideology that differed little from that of the NSP. It expressed the same hostility towards Westernization and advocated for closer integration with the Muslim world.

In the 1995 national elections the Welfare Party received 21.6% of the vote and formed a coalition with the right-of-center True Path Party (TPP) (the successor of Demirel's Justice Party), with Erbakan as Prime Minister. Welfare's victory sent shock waves throughout the secular establishment. For the first time since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was run by an Islamist party with an Islamist Prime Minister.

However, the Welfare Party showed little capacity for addressing Turkey's mounting domestic problems. Erbakan found it difficult to balance his anti-system campaign rhetoric with the need to consider the interests of the secular establishment, which was highly suspicious of his political goals, as well as of his commitment to democracy. Thus, instead of reducing social tensions, Erbakan's government further polarized Turkish society along secular-Islamic lines.

Welfare's policies alarmed the secular establishment, particularly the military. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council – which was dominated by the military – presented Erbakan with a list of recommendations to restrain anti-secular activity[3].

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[1] Rabasa A., Larrabee F.S. 2008, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND National Defense Research Institute. – P. 38.

[2] Landau J. 1976. The National Salvation Party in Turkey, in Asian and African Studies, Vol. 11. – P. 1–57.

[3] Günay N. 2001. Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations: A Scorecard, Research Notes No. 10, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

When Erbakan ignored the recommendations, the military held a series of briefings and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually forcing him to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a silent or post-modern coup.

In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed down by decision of the Constitutional Court, and Erbakan and some other key members of the party were banned from politics for five years. The February 28 process was an important political watershed. As A. Rabasa and F.S. Larrabee have pointed out, "it marked the abandonment of the idea that religion could be used to consolidate society, which had been at the root of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis"[1].

At the same time, it had an important impact on the orientation and development of the Islamist movements. It underscored the fact that a direct Islamic agenda could not succeed and would generate strong opposition from the secularists.

This led to an intense internal debate and rethinking within the Islamic movement about its future political strategy and agenda. A philosophical and political rift emerged within the movement between two different groups: the "traditionalists" (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan and his chief lieutenant Recai Kutan, opposed any serious change in approach or policy, while a younger group of "modernists" or "reformists" (Yenilikçiler), led by Instanbl mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his close associate Abdullah Gül, argued that the party needed to rethink its approach to a number of fundamental issues, particularly democracy, human rights, and relations with the West.

This internal debate was reflected in the emergence of the Virtue Party (VP) (Fazilet Partisi), which replaced the Welfare Party. However, while Virture was Welfare's successor, it differed in a number of important respects. Unlike Welfare, which was ideologically hostile to the West and Westernization, Virtue began to establish links with Western political values. This was an important ideological shift, as Islamic political identity had traditionally been built on opposition to the West.

After the Virtue Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001, the movement formally split. The traditionalists established the Felicity Party (FP) (Saadet Partisi), formaly led by Recai Kutan while the real leadership lay with Erbakan behind the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), with Erdoğan as party chairman. The party defined itself not as an Islamic party but as a conservative democratic party similar to Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Since its establishment in 2001, the JDP has increasingly emphasized Western political values such as democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in its public discourse, looking towards the West, especially the EU, as an important ally in its struggle against the restrictions of the Kemalist state.

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[1] Rabasa A., Larrabee F.S. 2008, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND National Defense Research Institute. – P. 44.

It seems reasonable to conclude, that the analysis of the Turkish politics in the period of the last two decades of the 20th century is extremely important in terms of understanding the nature of the political and social transformations that preceded the JDP's formation and influenced its leaders

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