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The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopelessстатья
Статья опубликована в журнале из списка RSCI Web of Science
Информация о цитировании статьи получена из
Scopus
Статья опубликована в журнале из списка Web of Science и/или Scopus
Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 11 мая 2021 г.
- Авторы: Shastitko A., Menard C., Pavlova N.
- Журнал: Russian Journal of Economics
- Том: 4
- Номер: 2
- Год издания: 2018
- Издательство: Некоммерческое Партнерство "Редакция журнала "Вопросы экономики"
- Местоположение издательства: Москва
- Первая страница: 175
- Последняя страница: 196
- DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031
- Аннотация: This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under bilateral monopolies but share skepticism about its efficiency if it ever exists. We suggest a different approach, based on transaction cost theory. First, since bilateral monopolies often develop in the upper segment of value chains, misalignment between parties may generate negative externalities. Second, if parties reach an agreement, the impact of the governance mechanism implemented must be assessed beyond the usual parameters of prices and quantities. Indeed, the risk of negative externalities in the absence of appropriate governance increases dramatically when “critical transactions” are at stake. With vertical integration prohibited, second-best alternatives in which antitrust authorities leave room for innovative hybrid governance may allow internalizing externalities while avoiding high switching costs.
- Добавил в систему: Павлова Наталья Сергеевна