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Consistent conjectures are optimal Nash strategies in the upper level gameстатья
- Авторы: Bulavsky V.A., Kalashnikov V.V., Kalashnykova N.I.
- Журнал: Прикладная математика и фундаментальная информатика
- Номер: 1
- Год издания: 2014
- Первая страница: 155
- Последняя страница: 157
- Аннотация: The paper examines some properties of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) developed for oligopolistic markets of a single commodity. Although, in general, the con- sistent conjectures are distinct from those of Cournot-Nash, we establish the following remarkable fact. Define an upper level game as that with the same agents as in the original oligopoly but with the conjectures playing the role of the agents‟ strategies. Then the consistent conjectures of the lower level (original) game provide for the Cournot-Nash optimal strategies for the upper level game.