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Аннотация:The Hintikka-style modal logic approach to knowledge contains a well-known defect of logical omniscience, i.e., the unrealistic feature that an agent knows all logical consequences of her assumptions. In this paper, we suggest the following Logical Omniscience Test (LOT): an epistemic system E is not logically omniscient if for any valid in E knowledge assertion A of type 'F is known,' there is a proof of F in E, the complexity of which is bounded by some polynomial in the length of A. We show that the usual epistemic modal logics are logically omniscient (modulo some common complexity assumptions). We also apply LOT to evidence-based knowledge systems, which, along with the usual knowledge operator K-i(F) ('agent i knows F'), contain evidence assertions t : F ('t is a justification for F'). In evidence-based systems, the evidence part is an appropriate extension of the Logic of Proofs LP, which guarantees that the collection of evidence terms t is rich enough to match modal logic. We show that evidence-based knowledge systems are logically omniscient w.r.t. the usual knowledge and are not logically omniscient w.r.t. evidence-based knowledge.