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Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Different Patience of the Seller and the Buyerстатья
- Авторы: Vanunts Arsenii, Drutsa Alexey
- Сборник: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
- Год издания: 2019
- Первая страница: 939
- Последняя страница: 951
- Аннотация: We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. When the participants non-equally discount their cumulative utilities, we show that the optimal constant pricing (which offers the Myerson price) is no longer optimal. In the case of more patient seller, we propose a novel multidimensional optimization functional --- a generalization of the one used to determine Myerson's price. This functional allows to find the optimal algorithm and to boost revenue of the optimal static pricing by an efficient low-dimensional approximation. Numerical experiments are provided to support our results.
- Добавил в систему: Друца Алексей Валерьевич