On Eavesdropping in Quantum Cryptography through Side Channels of Information Leakageстатья
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Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 11 ноября 2020 г.
Аннотация:In quantum cryptography, in addition to attacks on transmitted quantum states, states in side channels ofinformation leakage can be detected. The security of keys in real quantum cryptography systems cannot beanalyzed without the inclusion of information leakage through side channels. A quantum-mechanicalmethod has been proposed in this work to take into account key information leakage through side channels.This method is based on the detection of side electromagnetic radiation, active probing of a phase modulatorat the transmitter station, and re-emission of avalanche detectors at the receiver side. The method takes intoaccount joint collective measurements of quantum states in all channels of information leakage and operatesat any intensity and structure of states in side channels. The choice of special prolate spheroidal functionsmakes it possible to “match” the quantum and classical descriptions of signals in side channels. A relation hasbeen found between information leakage and the fundamental Holevo quantity. A transparent and intuitivelyclear physical interpretation of the results has been given.