"Естественное" и "надлежащее". Физическое и логическое обоснование некоторых аспектов раннестоической этикистатья
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Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 16 января 2019 г.
Аннотация:The paper is trying to solve the sharpest contradictions which were revealed in the ethical pan of I Stoicism during the last decades. Proceeding from the assumption that Stoicism was conceived as an I I integral and universal system with unified terminology and that the purpose of its physical teaching was I II to substantiate its ethics, the author in the 1st and the 2nd part of the paper attempts to clarify the terms of I physics relevant for the ethic part as well: universal nature (koine physis), particular nature (idia physis), relation (schesis), relation of a qualified thing (schesis poiou), things with general quality (koinos poia), things with particular quality (idios poia), the spermatic principle (logos spermatikos), necessity (ananke), structure (hexis), rigid structure (diathesis), types of movement, obstacles and causes.
Stoic categories for analyzing physical phenomena arc considered here as well. The main conclusions of the 2nd part are: (a) the term «nature» can be qualified as «universal» or «particular» in any context; (b) the complexity of movements depends on the complexity of the obstacles which a particular thing is able to overcome, the physical ground of this being the idea that more complicated structures (hexeis) have greater ability to change (epiteinesthai kai aniesthai) without losing theii identity; (c) the aim of the universal (cosmic) nature is not to enable each thing to achieve its goal, but to maintain the continuity of causation ensured by the structure of every particular thing (hexis) determining its relation to other things (schesis poiou). Applying these principles to some key problems of Stoic ethics, the author tries to solve the major contradictions observed by scholars and outlines a clear and consistent picture .of Stoicism as a practical philosophy based on solid theoretical grounds.
The subject of the author’s detailed analysis is the stoic concept of «conditionally proper» (kathekon peristatikon). Unlike the majority of scholars (Forschner and Long excluded with some reservations) the author is inclined to think that the difference between «conditionally proper» and «unconditionally proper» (kathekon aney peristaseos) can be explained by the Stoics' methodology and their teaching of categories, not by the change of the agent’s status or the material content of the action, these latter being caused by the difference of the former. If the essence of «conditionally proper» in the context of action is formulated as «the situation in which the choice of natural is impossible» (i.e. when the lesser evil is to be chosen), then any attempt to seek for the basis of «conditionally proper» in anything else but the generally recognized morality seems to be groundless. This point is of great cultural importance, for it does away with the idea of double standard ascribed to Stoicism, i.e. with the idea that the motivation of a wise man's actions and their material content are different from those of a common man. In the authors’ opinion, the «common standard» corresponds better to the aims of Stoa’s founders to work out a widely accepted and practically orientated teaching.