|
ИСТИНА |
Войти в систему Регистрация |
ИПМех РАН |
||
MAJORCA: Multi-Architecture JOP and ROP Chain Assemblerтезисы доклада
- Авторы: Nurmukhametov Alexey, Vishnyakov Alexey, Logunova Vlada, Kurmangaleev Shamil
- Сборник: Proceedings of the 2020 Ivannikov Ispras Open Conference
- Тезисы
- Год издания: 2021
- Издательство: IEEE Computer Society Press
- Местоположение издательства: Los Alamitos, CA, United States
- Первая страница: 37
- Последняя страница: 46
- DOI: 10.1109/ispras53967.2021.00011
- Аннотация: Nowadays, exploits often rely on a code-reuse approach. Short pieces of code called gadgets are chained together to execute some payload. Code-reuse attacks can exploit vulnerabilities in the presence of operating system protection that prohibits data memory execution. The ROP chain construction task is the code generation for the virtual machine defined by an exploited executable. It is crucial to understand how powerful ROP attacks can be. Such knowledge can be used to improve software security. We implement MAJORCA that generates ROP and JOP payloads in an architecture agnostic manner and thoroughly consider restricted symbols such as null bytes that terminate data copying via strcpy. The paper covers the whole code-reuse payloads construction pipeline: cataloging gadgets, chaining them in DAG, scheduling, linearizing to the ready-to-run payload. MAJORCA automatically generates both ROP and JOP payloads for x86 and MIPS. MAJORCA constructs payloads respecting restricted symbols both in gadget addresses and data. We evaluate MAJORCA performance and accuracy with rop-benchmark and compare it with open-source compilers. We show that MAJORCA outperforms open-source tools. We propose a ROP chaining metric and use it to estimate the probabilities of successful ROP chaining for different operating systems with MAJORCA as well as other ROP compilers to show that ROP chaining is still feasible. This metric can estimate the efficiency of OS defences.
- Добавил в систему: Вишняков Алексей Вадимович